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OHAPBH :t

lBt l'04nctlO11: b.

t1"Oblep& ~!1

Jib!.

I!thO(!

The purpose ot thi. briet note 18 to call attent10n to reoen' advances toward iU1 adequate d.et1n1tIc
of 11t., and to the p08s1bl11t7 tbat th. problem of
detW t1_ baa ...'ua11,. been 801ftct.

tal".

!be ..w pro,"ss h1qea large17

the blocbttmical 001\08Pt ot. _
..
the ooncept haa bee....
••pe.l*n,. 11Ipe ! aut'
the lut decade 0.1' . 0 ,
putlcularl,. in oonnection nth the vlJ1U1 and the en. , . . All the w.x hq)11•• , autooate.1.,.18 is the Pl'O0 ••• in which a lIubatance e.O" to cata.1yae, f'1'0JIl 1ta
.nvl~t,

OIl

ad41tlenal quaattt!•• ot the Bubstan••

Au'tooatal,t10 aot1_ 1. an obv1OU1 Pl"Opel"'ty
ot the vl:ua. an4 _ c1.. .,,""Ation it appeua bldeed to be the 801. aha to anllutlon 1thloh that 0 ....
ganJ.aa 18 able to advance.
lhelt.

fh18 geael'lllle0UJf8e of thought _,. pel'hapa be ategrated 1». toMGl. det1nlt1()1J8. It . . . . reasonable new
to
that t
t
01>-

'i
:1

It -1, pe:rbapa , . . .

• ta. . . ."

N ......bl.

:e-

to auppoae that such •

would NndeJl useless a thaaU expressl,.. intended to

work towa»d8 a det1nltl. ot lire, tM author ot the above text
would have us belle....
Mal'l,.

80.

that;

the task 14 cO.l'IQ)letM ..

81",

at least,

It la. however. p .....1a.ly this ldn4 ot attitude and

th1s ldnd ot etatement against whioh this theal. 18 direeted.
.

lQl

.

. fa

2

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION.
'be defined.

~

tem detin1tion• itself must

The mean1nss ot det1n1tlon are aa diverse as the

selenees which attellPt to detine.

tiona 1ft 11' 1t 18

It. .ol~.

obtained ind:uo'tlvelf.2

ot the

Eve17 science bas 1ta "det1n1.

"&1,

1t. de.f1nltlcna must be

1'hereto:re, the,. depend directly upon the

method of tm. partIcular seieneth

!h18 mea:ne that to the ext$llt

that the method 01 a paJltloular selenee 18 oJ'da1Md to exam1ne
the

nature ot th1nga, to the same extent are the "datinlt!. ."

obta1ned"real det1nlt1an...
gu1ah three _in ,typee

Ac••rd1ngJ.y. we are able to diatin-

otso~l.d

det11l1t1ona claimed by the

various modem seienoM, the solentist$ tbe:rn$elvea. however,
usUAll,. would not use these tenna,

the . . . .ntial det1nl tlon

(Whlch leads to knowle4ge of the ane.losous natUl'e of metaPh7&lcal
iJ $

21 am U$1ng the 'beN "1nd1JCtlontt after the manner ot George
P. Ilubertaru:, S.J. f in fhe Phl1OSlih{; of Human Naturel 'SIP. 888389: "It hu already
BUgge. . hi! a
lral va knowledge baa two stages t 1'1%"8t, the stage of dlaoovo17 or onqu1l"1J
s. . OI'l4, that fit critical evaluation or judgment upon the conelusl• • 8acbed, or in otbeJ' worda ... sta.S- or inductlon and a
second .tage of ~J1ation andew.luation (ria. Invetlon18. via
ludic11).
r_

be_'

a......

"!he _thod or dllcOV4itry OJ." 1ndu.ctlon concema the oris1n ot
the ov1d. . . with which one is to de ..l. At this p.1nt,. there aw
two ba.81cal17 dltteJlfmt methods. FOP some evIdence is immediatel
presented, in e:a:;perlenee.... We can call this the methodot

tell1gIble tnductlon.'

'in-

"on the other hand. mIi1n7 things cannot bedlacovered by immediate 1.tu11ght.... to awlve at an understanding, we have to us
l'Ioundabout methode at lnve.tiga:tlotl.... fhls rotlJ'ldabout and ve'l'Y
ccap11cated. pX'OC••• of' dlsC0T8:ry we call 'rational induction. ,.
Philosophy pl'ooeoda from 1nte1l1g1ble lnduction, p~slcal science
tHm ratlcmal irlductlon.

3

def1nltlOll8), the open.tlcmal definition, and the construct.
1'he "assent!.al 4e:r1n1t:f.on.tt as

QIl8

m1l#1t auppo,u), 1s eon-

eamed nth the 8ssence of the thing a..t1ned.

Ita proper use 1.

the log10al olaaslf'loatlc:m. of tbinp aocol'ding to pnus andspe-

el...

?'hue.!!!l 18 e.aent1aUr d..tined as Mtlona;l

!J!a.,.

The

18 no.thlns 1n ,.alit.,. that correapOllda to this d..tini tion !!. such.

There exiata onl.7

!!!!!. "tional

A _taph)'aloal anal,..1_, then,

an1mal or tha,t "ttonal animal.

«0.8

no" o.elud. to a logioal

4e.t1nit1on .. eaepuaccl4ent&ll,.. 1». tM •••_ that; 1t 18 one and

to.. .ame ph11eaopber whouees 10g10al d..tWOl.... to el....117
those ebjee.a _ 1s oo.u14er:Uls in

~1'

juds- up. . their _ta;pbp1oal status.

on

that he _,.

~

able to

the othe~ hand.

-.ta-

pbJ-s1ea1 det1n1t1cm" ... the ppult at .. __ph,.a1o&! analJ81s 1.

not .. oontMd!.otiOll 1n

.Z'JI8.

It;, too, attas..u to the utUN of

tbbtg8 1noludlq, however, the aul!1f1W1 oharaoter of real1tTI
•

and not the univocal uadeNtand.1ng of a log10al d&t!n1tlou.

i!U!1c!i=

~~tWtl!.,

theJlerOl'e, 1a used 1ft th1a. theei. to mean t

Ol'1tologlcal statue td a o.ptain NnS* tit be1ngs (in this

11!!!a

~ae)

••••e . . . .
I

in

fie.

80

h.r ... eaoh of tbo•• b4linga 1n

p~lpl.

whtoh 18 aulogoua to

.~

a1

0 .... ,

!!!!. P.Z;

p-

pl'lnolple 1n an-

other (llv!JlSl th1nEh

And a _taph,-.1eal d.ef1nition, toumted ...

1t 18 upon the

thinS-, can only beanalosoua., Just as,

~8,..

whlJA the.. Mally

of

ens.

no UR1wNal as such. theN 18 a found..

tlon 1n H-allty foZ" universals, .0 ala. theN 18 a toundatloa 1a
the outologteal statu.

.r

thJ..ngB whtu..b,."lUe"

ean be predloawd

(o~

not)

th1ng

or' all or them. Evon

"

though the Itt. of each 11vL-,g

18 radloall1 t.U.tf'el'ent from that of every othe.r 11v1:ng ,

thins. st111 'theJle 18 something the . . . . . .oundum. iu14.

2hJ,a

twm a _taphya1cal definition.

Halllat! . . 18 1!Ihat I

ftapeN.tlonal de.t1nltlan" must be dlstJ.Dgu1shedt

it 18 to

be

d1at1ngu1ehed ... that wb1ch .1s .. prlac1ple of knowledge trom that
whloh U a oonclualon.

~Z thltough

It 1s

an analp18 oZ the

flu!'1'1,"

at 80J18 1d... or t ta natuN

(the e.xpl'fllJa _thad. of th1B thea!.)..

In this ••nse, the opera-

opeNtlone ot .. th1D,g'bbat

1f$,

tional det1nlt1on adequately

4~,.o%'!b..

"al1t'J as 1t appea1'l'8 to

'.l'hutt. UD is .. th1ng which nOUl"iahea .1 tselt. 8Htf-

the obael'i'Mr.

repl'Oduees, sens•• f desires. and 1a able to urlderstand. 'I do not
intend to gift an,. phU_ophioAl cOlmotatlona to the tem ·opew.tional. clet1n1 tIm", It

:c .lab to use 1t to _an

only tho desc2'iptl

of' a thing 1n tems of the _'1 it acta.

!here 14 another t'JP8 oE opel'at1oaal d.et1n1tiOD., however.
whioh I have called t.bf: "ccnst:ruot."S

!he knowledge expressed in

••

II . . using the tes "oaaatwct- 1n the -'1 suggested b7

FatbJ,.. tcluM1'tan& 1». Introduction,!! the Phil-iii'.!! ~1y, Pp.
262-268: ·OestructUR"1 awx.age o~ iM1 ' seveR! CSharao
teriatl... It 18 t.1ret o:raU ...... t the le..1 of 801ent11'1.
knwledge 1Ih1eh 18 0'lU' ma1D cOIlOem here ........lect1ve (ftabat:N.C-

tlve") ••••

·See.til,., oone tJIIUC tural knowledge of. the real api... by

l'&tlODal induction.

(Italics hiB)

"~1'dl.." and taoat o~cterl.tloan"lt COl'18tructural knowledge 1. 1ndll'8et,. that 18, the knowledge at one thing in t . . . of
another." And 1n his Phl1,osol>!ll of H:!!!a Natw.-e, P. 391: "1be

&

th1a det1n1tian Is indirect and adds a "med,1um.ft to dlI90t

CODDOn-

••n8. ebaeZ'VatlO'D.J an4 because the • .treot .O't this .medium re_1n8
1n the oODCluslon, th18 t,pe of det1nition 18 called oonstruetuX'al...

I'otl•• that there

with real

thlasa

!!. kttowledp sA !StUtZ:

that the ph'p101a',

1t 18 p. . .l ••17

t"" eaapl..

18 coneemad.

But beoana. the ph,.So1."ts teohn1q,ue laolu4ea laboratOl'7 control

the readbga

&.treet

or

1u'~_,

.. apeotal

_~odolo87.

PhJalo.,

the "JPe ~ knwle4g8 he bu.

pletel,. o. .truo~l Hlenee bl thta . . . . .
10 eMl"gJ. te exa.mp18" . . . . .

lit

~

~

o~

.nerD' nor to tathca

80

1ta: -.n11'estatIC118.

p8,.oholog1at will

~.~

_.~.

rar ... the m1n4 8an _the

""1'711'0- in the de.crlp·-

tian o£ • •2-D' is a q;u.antl''1' 1t has l'lU'llbe:r-ftlu.
expe~ntal

.ca-

In "clet1n1ngft kinet

operatlou pr04U01ng such

Bather, "%'8118 oona14e1'e4 onl:ru

._leaU,.

then, 18 a

84oe18...t1_ S distance," there

18 no atteapt to UD4.NU:n4 the u.tuN

cmtol081oal reaUtJ' of

l ' O&1mot but

Again,
the
,

f!l.!!ilQ1'J.8 1n te. . of tM

,be-.p1e....
turth.,.

••• and. oan•• q~ o£ the . 8 ~Ntlonal 1D.4uct1on oan be .een
in tba . . . .
ID . . . cue. 1t . . . . to be p.alble to
elSah.._
teolm1que or lna'bl"Um$nt ~_ 1Jhe .tateaent ot the
ooncluslon .". a.
a4...... ' 'but 121 v.", ""7 other 1nstanoea
tbe teebl:dque ....1Da 1ft the . . .lul_. Inothe~word8. not on1
-18 .be pl"OOe4ure an 1nd1reot one J the ver, knowledp 1 tsel.t gaine

througb.auoh .. technique 18 1t••l t 1nd1reot, v con..atl"UetuNl."
!'hI. 41at.lnotlan 1- to be oaapared with 'bba. _d. by laoques Marl
tain in !be RtI£!•• t)~ Jg!OW1.". be _ _ eaptn. .';ttl0 and anano_t10 knaiI.a:s-_ Miapa,.. ft!that work 1. relevant to this 418
cu•• ian •

00.,

• Lou18 lI. SeU.lb.e

Phl"oal Wo.pld.

Ino. Pbilad$lpnla.%§. 'p_ 111.

P. Blak1aton'. 8<111 ad

bodily ohanges produ.:e4, aome q,uantltat1ve el8D1$'nt 1s chosen to

ll'ePMsent the natuNot emotions.
pM_.ion in quantitatIve

observable object.
the WJ!1 :nature

to~

A eonstl"Uot, then, 1s an ex-

of whatever is meuUl'tlble in an

fhi. meaeurement 1s used u

or

the object.

If 1t "presented

fhe oonstruot ie muoh Uk. what

Mar!tain _ana by tlemp1Jt1!1Qlog1oal. anal,..I....
Il'l apeaklDg . , -.p1.r101og1cal cal,..1. oztexplanatlon

we haye said that aueh anal,..!. deal. w1 th real pos8i-

bl11tl•• or obN.,.tlcn and .....Ul\'8m8n., w1th effectual physioal ope.tlona. $'he pemanent possibilIty ct
, . . .:1bl~ Ye.-Ule.tlm ana BUUJemellt playa the s . .
pal. heN u •••ence d.oes to]} the philosopher ••• 1t
8Ub8~1 'UM8 to'l} it and take. 1 te place .....5

Ph11oaopb1ea1l7, the d1ft.,..nH between the cestruot and t
•••ent1al.. metaphreloa1 d..tin! tion 18 the presence or the jud.gmen
cd ••paatlon., the 1nteUeotual paaap1n8 of the tact that eve:r,r

agent .a such 1•. :11\

~~.

We w1l1 ••• more

or

th1a u we proceed.

Let me just _'tate he. that the distinction beWeen
de~1nltlon

ope N.t1 on.

To 8Ubmlt the material thing onl,. to measurement. 18

agent 18 act1rag;

tMS.

,,-pes of

1s baaed upon the distinction between process an4

to beoome acquainted

8'1lOh.

~

1f1~

the..

the material conditions undor' which the

aN the material. process.,. of lit..

PJlOO&S ••• aN the

Aa

4. .1n of the ph,aloal ••1entlat.

!'he tthOW'" of the •• pl'OCes.o. is the only lIo._ue.'" 1n which he 1.

intel"&8ted.

!!lus, to ea.y that .. Hllv1ng thiIlg 18 an objeot which
, 4"

,,111 ab&wb W'J,d syntbesize 8u'bstanee." is to d•• cr1be operations;
but 1t is to deser1be ther.l in ter.tllS Qf.' the experimentally abeerv
Pl'O(UUlS&1'5

of' .terial l1.fe.

Such a dot1nltlcm describes _terial

'Vogetative lite .. but nothing more.

'U81ng the aame observation

ot nutl'1tlan, the phlloeopMr 18 able to ••paftlte the aot ot
nutrition consldeNd preo1sely ..a an act, tram the mate1"'1al moTIl!.s latter understanding ot aotlvity

tiona that .ocomp&lJ' 1t.

that which leads to

18 th$ tlrstty,pe of opG.N.tlcm.al definition:

metaph'J81cal bowl.elge .•
!BE PROBL1.f4 OP LIPB.

lP?Om

tho.e 'Or1.t eonaiderat1ona, it

shoul4 beg1n to bee. . apparent that knwledse

ot

th1n8*

u

seU1Na

desoriptions ot

observation

or

a

th$

mel.ea..

It la, of eOUl"15e, tl'lrou.

operat1one that ..

ls, "-"17. howeVO', 18 that step
mad.e, Wluall,. tbe reault

trwl nature

lINt "d• .t1n1tl0A8- we poss.ss are

wa7 $h1ngs OpeNte.

th1ns'.

or the

.v.~

0(88

tully

to know wM.t 1t

_de.

II

•

Whet1' it 1.

t. a 10810,&1 claa.ltlcatlon of man,.

under one, wh1oh# u sueh • .finds no axacst OOl.Ulterpal'f; in 1'8al1t,._
ftJ.e 1M1;jlt into the nature

or anJ'th1na,

then" in

80

tar as that

nature 1. real, 1s tru17 dU1'1e'UltJ and the nature of 11t'e 18

probably the prtm. example

o~

this d1tttculty*

We 1t1 manit••ted in ope:rat1ons and movements It
s1ats all ettorta to "stabilise" it 1n a emoept.

W.~ ..

Lite 18 d,nam-

10, it 1... (uatinw,*7 of ex1stenoe 1ft a special wa7.

Ute 1.

observable pr:1me.r117 .s oameotedw1th matrter, 1.1t8 1s tber-etore

8

in someway measurable.

ted

m

two main distortions ot the natUl."e

tQ consider lUe as

or

All or thea. a.epeo t8

or

lit. have resul-

lUe.

!he tint 1.

.ssentially opeationJ this has two torms,

both d.enying substantiality, but the one being paD-vitalistic 1n
terms ot a vital tol1C~ aDd 1'121 as ~ essence

at

all reality. 6

and the otJlel!' OVtu:"17 atel'lallstl0 1a stressing the process

natUJlO 111 telVUJ ot _tioD in the st:r1ot sens•• 7

or

The' second 418-

tonion 18 the :reduction of vi tal operations to mechanical pro-

oeas•• without
agent..

~ ..

nec.a.~17

denying the aubetantiality at the

a". the1'etore. thfte pl'Oble. t.

~

raced and an-

_red in anal.7&1ng the metapbysical status of 11te,
18 a question at 8thOd,
ed to what. 18

'l'he tiNt

Is a metaph,aieal analysi. to be 11m1t-

_".U8~

In material. things?

OJ-

in otherwOJ'ds

and JIlOM d1reo'bl1. What '8 the val141'y or the jud.s1aellt of ••p .....

rat10ll'

seoe4lJ', Ie the,.. any juatlt1eatlO'1l t .. positing the
"

reallt,. of
the

~h1D8

.Y1~nt

but operation and at tbet _... tUte pre•• nina

d)'D&l'l31c ella_eter ot 111'.' P1U11,-, Doe" the philo-

eophl0 _thod

ftft'lmt oOllOlud1ng

(ll"e) that 18 abcq

'Cn.

to tb8 eld.at.ne. of a nali ty-

11m1tatlons ot att••, time, and change

and that at the su. time

cl._

not exclude

:matt.,..,

timet and mo-

t1011t
6S•• Henri Bergson, L'.,YolutlO1l ONalnc!, Chapter III.
"C:reat1on et evolution.
.".
o~ la~·

!h!l!it.

o~
Ohapte!t III,
and ..pee!..XX,. 5. I .... Ie.

'1S•• Altl'Od B. Whitehead, !lode.

"''the (hIdep

9

!HE DIVISION OF SOIENOES.

'!he,. 1a noth1ng

laOM evident 1B

the NaJ.m r4 soiene•• than the eumtualon that can m.8ult f:rom an

1nadequate dietino'lliQt1 and l'eoogn1tlon of toJilmal objeou.
and the 8ame eubj•• t 1. able to be t"..ted undeJt a number

c.e

or

dir-

ferent asp.eta and .tormall ties t Mch oonstltuting .. dltrennt

scienoe.

!hUll. _ , atud1ed. by .. chemist 18 iron. hyd;pcgen, obi

ride, eto. J a 'b101eg1at oonsiders him as CCIllPoseQ. of millions of
living

.en.,

the p8,..holog1st

8M8

¥,n as: a blmdle

or

nenes,

the ph11osopher calla hUs a ,..tional anl-.l, and so on, 1nthe

various I.ieno... Doe. .ach aoi••_, thereto"" d:et1ne "lII8ll"
with a Hal dAttln1tlan.'

Does "1"11 and. h)'dJ'Opn"

.xPNS8

th.

aame Nality u "buDdl. of nerve." or aeStational animal"' Let
WI take our example ot the natuM 0'1 lite and. briefl,. exaaine the

methocl ot cel"ta1a S.!eM•• in treatlq Uvina thlnga.
I'he object ot o1ol.oST 18 the -.te»1a1 llnng thing preols.1,.

in

'0 tar as

"

1t :1a _te.1&1 and. l1v1nS.

t.rhe method of blo1oQ 1.

dire.t ob••:rvat101l and the use of expel'btenta. :No oonclusion 1.
aee.pled unless l' oan be ..rifled e.xpel'1antally.

B1elcgy, then

studt•• llv1ng _ttep •••peeiallr 1». 1t. ult1mate constItut1on:
the oel1.

na...

All or its _tefta1a are objeots of the ••

Mol

gy 1. caneemed With :plat and anfmal l1re. and, indeed, because

of 1 ta _th04, t t oan ask about no ethe:-

tON

of l1te.

PayoholoQ 18 41 vlded into two_ill part.:
Imd

ph11oaoph1cal

ezpen.ntal. PhUosophioal p.ychol087 1. oons1de:red a part

of phlloaophy.

It tl"N.te of the nature of man, a ccma1deratlan

10
in t . . .

~

cause. both o:t man'. operations eQ

oonstltution.
human

~lf.

Ph1lesoph1cal PfJ7CholOQ.

or

his 8ssent!al

theJleto~,

treats ot

J 1t, .sMn. oulJ' to that 11t. whoa. principle 18 a

soul" and, . " . pl'OPel-l,., a ratic:&\al aoul..

Ex.pe:p1mental pay-

. cho10S7, l1ke blolou,la a measUJ:l!ng aol,. . . _ Ita method i .
ob••M'Iltion and the.

'WI.

~

exPel-'imenta.

It titters from biology

in tbat what 1t obaeM'$8 and measurea 1. the psychic stat. of the

I1v1ng

~

in questlan.

EXperimental p8,.eholoQ 18 eOllcemed

nth the ma.n1t.8ta:tlOD.&t of vit.l opel'G.1;10118, mON precisely. the

matenal and ph,.loal lIUd.festiatlO118 o£ l1te..-proc.ssea.

Thi.

doe. not _ _ tha1; the P87Chologia' dM. not judge upon spiritual

entities"

It does meu that .ueh a judgment 18 p.....d 1n.

or eonatl'UCta.
_~tleal

ual

be~J

'!be ltlntell1gena. q.u.otlon"lt

,uant1ty

4Oft8

t.~

1s a constJl'Uet.

lfh1a

not measure the ilItell.e' of a epu!t-

1t MPNa.'.'lbat 18 .aaUll'able tn such

&ft

1I1te1•

loe.'. wol'k1l1S ot Genaln px-obl....
file phUoaoph7' of MtuN. too, 1s conoerned with living

things .. but not 0Dl,. 1a 'their aspect or t:lvIy_

the ph!loaoph7

of natUM 18 .-14.2' 1J.han any ot the above ••1eno•• J 111 tut, the
high•• '

pan

-tase ot

the philosoph,. of MtruM embrac•• at least in

a tield of phlloaophIoa1 psycholQgJ.

!he philosophy ot

natuN itself, howver. 18 also 11m1ted 1n the extent to which it
studI•• being.

!hi. soienoe OQ1'lSlders only mat.:rial beIng) :yet

It includ•• an ana.1,..U ot the causes of material beIng and. so
pNp&rea the

\1111.7 :to. a hlghe7 .olenoe.

11
The

sotellO•• consIdered thus tar,. as most otber sciences,

are 11m1ted by their formal objects to .. can81del'&tion ot only a
part of being.
U

!beN 1s anothel' science whloh cOllsldel"S being

such; t.h1. 1. _taph,.alos.

ing 1n 80 tar as it 18 being.

The object of _ _physics 1. beThi8 dlet1ngu1ahes metaphysics

t:POm bioloQ, which oonalders be1D8 in

So

tv as 1t 1. material

and l1111nSJ tl'Ol1 P870hology. which otm81deN be1:ag 1n so far as

1t i • •entient and manUestIJ intellection,
phl1osoph7. which c ....1ders being 1ft eo
and aubjeot to

_tlorh~

~

ra.

u

trom natUftl.
1t 18 material

Metaphplca ltuell.. the nature of What

1t _ana to exUt J and existence is exP"s". in many -'18.

Two

of the ways or mod.. of enstence aN 01&881£10d aa l1ving and

non-living.

NOW theae aft logical clual:tloatlona

ot "aJ. th1nge

when we have e.mined the meu,phyalcal atatu. of the be1np l'$p-

Naented in those c1aultloatlona, . . w.l11 find that tbe1"e 18 as
•

gNat .. dirt.rence between the liVing thlDga themaelve. as tbere

1s bet.Mn tho•• oOfttra4lot."le...

And

yet, as . . mentioned be-

ton, there 1. aODlltth1q 1n all I1v1na th!.l'lp whleh validate"

such .. ola•• 11"1catlon.

fh1s Is the analogous character

or 11te ..

As . . .ball •••• 11te, sblce 1t 18 nothlng but a special. mo&t 01"
being,

u analosous

When Rid ot the dl.tte:went iMd•• ot o.1nSJ

f'urthell' .. the _taph781oal

la:r

saa.

statue or each 1ndlvldual in a part1ou-

of 11.t. 1s analogous, and not univocal, to that of

e'V,,!'1 other- lndlvldual.

In line with th!s d1atinctlan ot .tonual objects, *ri.ta1n

12
d1at1ngu1ahea tl:l.Ne types of biological knOflledge.
Fint of' all there 11'111 be an Gq)irlemetrlc or physIcomatnemat10al b1ol0S1. a biologr which w1l1 tend ult1matel;r to otter a mathematical 1utol'Pfttatlon of sensIble data ••• beu1n.g on what _., be oalled the material
conditioning ot lite. the physloo-chem1oal meana of 11te •

•••••••••• * ••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••••••••••
.t \d.ologleal 1m_ledge 1s this ,hilOllOih1e a l .. 1.••• which 1s a PftJ?tloulaXt ohapt.". 0 m
P1i!l:oao . o~ nattu.. and in wbJ.eh corte.pta w111 have tbel2*
full bl" 191b1e. fft1gh'b, tMlxa whole. apecul..atlve value
wi thcutt U1'3' tW'01rJs back t_ftl the .ena... In it explanatioa ..111 be _ought 1n teme of a ra,1aOll· (1.atl'e o:zt prmclple of intellIgibility and ot ••• a.~':~.8
'!b6 third. tJ'pe

I.

: ,

FurtheJ". be,.cmd and above the ph1108opby of uture, there is tM

_tapb181cal ..pp~oaeh .... intend to take hen_
!boM 18 a method fd 1nv•• tlgatlon lUI.d In the plqe10al sed.-

enoea that 1s not to be 11m1ted to
science a8 auch.

fh1. method baa var10ua names; uauaU7, it 1.

called -isolation. a

under this method. the aclantiat bal.atea

or a.paN.taa ;trom Ita
he ls Udiel'e,ted.

aolano•• but; belongs to

thOS8

env1~nt

ISolation

ha$

the pa:rtloula:- element in whloh

two _in tOX'ml.

the .eparating out of known elements in

ol'ld.e~

The

first i .

to study one ot

thoae 81emenu in ,. t.elt., fhue, the blo-cbfQ1st examSnea the
amount 01' prote!n 1n a .ewing o£ salmon.
I

I

The .econd f'om pro-

11
c.ede by way of negation.

When 8.m1ninga oertain substanoe,

tor eample, tor the oause ot a diBa••• , the soientist dlecoveftJ

that the p:re••nce ot three known tutors, w, x,

and '1. in

other

substances _c... ioned no disease. ne, thel'efoN. ooncludes to a
fourth 'aetor. a. d1tte1'8llt than the three others..

1ns the

.ube~.

be diaeovel'8 tbe caUle at the disease.

111 aepa_tins

has 1solatecl "

Upon eamin-

n.

the ilap.'ent futOH, w, x, and '1'.

t!'Om tbe whole subatanoe. In a sim1lar ma.nner, but 1natead ot
miOl'OfSoopct op

ape.iN'oope" the pb11oaophet1, WIlDS the me:S.ibt

ot obse""tlon and N.t1ect1on, ..~t.e8 caus•• from cond.1tlOlJ.8
and canelwiN to the Qistence at the ".- h.oto• .from the in-

.utt1el4mC7 C'4 the obI' tutON to .ap1.a. the· observation.
this manJ'l.8r,

~l",

the _taphye101an

Judsea that

In

a ll&Jl'tleular

8ubaanc. 11... , not bMaus. 1. 1. _teJl1al and baa op4tNt10l'l8

eonoamed with matter, 'bu'becauae "

1s wo .tom and baa ita
•

panloulaJl mod. of ex18tcmM aa _11 as its operations Pftc1••1,.
~eau.ae

ot that fo_.

It IIlSt be a'NalUtd that this tbeau 18 not part or the aocalled ftlleehan1sa va Vi tal1em.,9 debawh
f:rom . .taphJ'81cal poun4a.

!hi. Itdebate" ia taJ!'

Firat ot all, both meebanlata and

Vita11sta recognl_ only mah2!'tal lIte: .eban1ate, 1naotar u

the,. oans14.3? life to oonsiat of attex- in motion, v1 'ballets, In-

sot'u as the,. conalde. lire to apr1ng tztom . . . aoz-t ot enepgy
11 d'

...

• F

14

that 1s not exactly pattex- and yet 113 material.
.fxaomtbel~

method than

.t~

anything elJle.

srt:l'lie stems more

Bleil" investigatIon 1

bioleglco-psycholog1cal, using obs&xwvatlm-measuring techniques.

The st1"8es is upon experiments} Dothblg is admitted except what 18

verified In the laboNto:ry_

Such an attitude rules out any poss!

blllty of an exPlanation: of life that would include a non-materi

or even

801Jl..aess

lite.

possibility

b$cc4UBe

ing what he

can

pheI" oan.

OOlIte

The metaphysician must
o0D81del" such ".-,

h1s .field 1s the whole realm

1m. ., 01 God.

It

a,. -rr well

to reoognize an· othel" than

ot

being. inolud

be that a philoso-

_t.~al

oause ot vi tal

recognising the existenoe ot God
separated substanoe. J Hans Drleseh did just that.10 Moat of Ar1.
operatIons without

p" ;Anima

tatle's

~11clt17

18

3Ust that. 'l'his. however, it seems to me is

l'Ctcogn1t1on of soul-life only) and the soul ls the torm of a
material th1ng.ll When the ph1,losopber "oognizes the existence
0.

,

or

other than matel!'ial beings,. his anal:181. of lire is not truly

metaphysioal unless he .t1n4s 1 t ver1fied in those other beings.

For, the h1ghest .tom. of material lite touches the lowest ot the
F

t

lOS•• Edward T. Smith. tlb Vi taUs., at Hans Driesch,· !he
~~~Tt. vol. 18, PP. le&-a27.
-

Ust 4' 1'hc!IIaa Aqu.1mla, In II s.nt.. 1'1, 2. 1, act 1: Ad. p~
ergo d1cend*. quod :lntelliotus
'negat't.l:r osee tonna materia11.
qu1n det esee materia. slout torma substant1ali. quantum ad 88$.
pr1mumJ et 14.0 opol'tet quod a4 d1vi$1onem mater1ae, quae oausat
dlverea individua, 8equator etiam mult1p11eatl0 intellectual
1dest anima. tnt811•• t1vae.

non'

15
ap1rltual.12
S"ondly _ moat

or

the Mchan1I1U are rather united in their

reduction ot 11te to phys1co-chem1cal actlon.

n1net.en'ih centul'J evel"1 depaz-tment of physical. aolen.. baa been tested an4 rO'tJ!ll4 u •• tu.l 1n the
atud,. fd organ1. phenom.ena. and. at length we have won
a certain measure or 8UCC••S in 4.8cl'1.b1ng 'living
matter. aa a phyalco-cham1ca1 8,.atem.13

Dur1ng the

Reoall alao the text with whlch thi. paper' began.

1'be author

(Smith) 1n thfl same a.t'ticle 8ays:
C_tempO.X7pa.,che1ogy 18 a natuMl1at10 d1soipline.
Ita lnt:rcduetoF,J text. are diacM.tl,. mechanistie; ita
e.dwnced texts IU" bolder. Ita j0\U'Ul.8 look dmm
their noa•• at aa1mietlc tem1noloS1, and ita beavielthinkeR balta to assure U8 that theN must be tneuft,l
eorrelat•• t 't0l!' even their 1'IOM elaborate construots ,.14
The

reason tor th1a at'1tu4e, of

method..

.ou~,u.,

18 to be found in their

Baving 1'Uled out at the etart anythlng that cannot be

meaa\U'6d. the MohanisD' phraSing ot the problem 1 ta.lf' 1s taX"
tl*om :reallst10.

list. th0ma8, .~ fi1bl"Um 4. Senau at Sen••te, 1, 1, n. 4: Rerum autem, 1nt.l"Iio uk qU1!em ni.iXXlua P&i't!.' oorpel'18 est It ut
PNbatn.1r tonio de Ari1ma: unde noa poteat oona1dera%"1 per oem....
oNtlOXl4m, vel applioat1on•• ad eol"P'Wl vel ad allquod organ_
oorporeum. .x1ma. an1m oonO""!o 8lus •• t in. anima # 8'Uml'DA aut_
.ius abatl"&ctl0 est 1n 8ubatant118 ••puetl.. Et 1deo prelete:11brum «l-'- MI. An.totela. n_ t •• it Ubrwa de' lntelle.tu at intelllgl'13IlI: vel al tMl •••t, non pertineNt ad :.:olent1_
naturale., sed J!lM1a !! .t&ih.l.lc",~, culue •• t oonalderaH de:
8ubstant118 ••paiii:[a.

l~. J. BendeX'Son, "Meohan1am" Pht-1.oRhloal Revie•• vol. sa.."

p. 571.

1"Ic4mC1_ Sldth, p. 330.

16
Thirdly. theN aN two classes ot vitalists.

materialistic. the second, spiritualistic.

The tirst is

P%'O£e•• o1' Rignano

writes:
Attempts have bH.n made to compare the assimilatIve
process and the growth ot 11ving substance ldlleh
sometimes follOWlll w1 th the growth at crystals in &
salt solution. The two proceSSes are, how.ver,
substantially different.15
Rignano sp.nds a book trytng to show the ·substantial d1ftereDce"

between living and dead. processes.

Hans Driesch spent man,. 'JGars

exPep1ment&lly trying to prove the same thing.

This one quota-

tion tram Riguno indloate. their d1fterenoe:

Dr1e.cht$ fenteleclq' is represented, we repeat, as
belng an agcm.t without a spatial seat, without a
mater1al baai. and W1thout energetic potentiality_
Hence his comparison with the human intelllgenoe
and will. far .tram 8impllfying his 1dea. only tends
to make 1t more obscure, sinoe the tentelecily' laoks
all the spatial, mat.~al and energetiC eGRdltlona
wh1eh. aCGordIng to tho find1ngs of pa,.chology, are
necessary far the functlon1ng or the ht.1.nUUl 1ntel11gence a:n.d wm themselves. l £),
R!gn.ano, greatly des1l'OU8 of finding en

eas~t1al

dltf'erence

between organio and inorganIc nature f does not make the neoesslU7
conclusion to an 1aaater1al pp1nclple
hopes in an "energetio vitalismlt -

o~

life. but places hi.

still quite matel"1al, at111

quite ooneemad With • .treat. and not causes.

Dr18soh doe.
make
,

the neoeslull'7 oonclusion to an lmmateplGl. oause:

~en1o Rlgnano,

-

!l!. 'fC!1~ure Of f,lre.

16 Ibld., pp. 12'7-128.

the need for

London, 1930.

p. 4.

1'1

an extemal. 1nf'lue.e to

UCOWlt

tor varlat10n in a $yste•• l"l

And ".'. attemptlq to utab11sh th18 ooulualcm purel,. OD an

ex.pe»imental bUls, Drleach tails to ••cape the 01-1t1018m of
R1gnmo bee«WI. he 18 4eal1ng with Mn who
.U..ta to bt

t~

0111,. reality.

consl~r

.uUl"able

I .....:r U poaalbl,. the l"OasCll

wh7 Drl.s.h •• work o01llelud1Dg. as l ' does, to an immatenal prinoiple of lUe, haatal1ed to 1mpft8. m._t modem sclentlsts ldght
be ireol.~ll ",caws. hAJ has attempted
method.

to meet them with their

01dl

Ua1ng expeJ'iaente and meuUNMnM ups u'bertal 11v!q

th1ngl, Dr1. . . oonolu44ta to a p,,1aclp18 that oannot be . .asured
111 1taelf.

1'0 .....UM that prb.J.olple 1n 1ta

the pobl•• to _te:pl6l baaea.

.tte.t.

18

to

re~

.And. tbe•• _te:r1al baaea aM pr.-

el.el,. all that the modem 8clent1ate w111 a4m1t to be real.
stud,. ot the .tteeta
caus...

or

A

lIving opepatlona le tar tram. a study of

Henee, b101og and experimental p.ychology (adequately
,

tul.tl11lng tn.1 .... proper f\mctlorw) a" _'hodologlcally unable to

ueertau the tJ:"Qe na1.-..1" ot 11te.
I hope I have not appeaMd to belittle a:trI ••1eMe.

My

pe1nt 18 tbat the l1m1tations of e..on .olence must be recognised.
lio 8cl. . . can p%'ODOUDOe up_ the nat\U.'fe or anJ1;h1ng whan that
selene. 18 methedolog1call,. comm1tt.d to an eum1natlon ot etlect8

!!+Z-

and con.dltlcm.a

fhe ~ta ot that 8elence may ....11 be use"

b. dlacOYez-mg nature. J but to define att.,r the manner o£ a
'*

b

18
philosopher 1n Ul'mS of tho material conditiONS under whioh a

11v1nS tm1ng 1$ obs8rtable 111 to fall into the construct-fallacy

!J&ntloned betore. !he scientist gives an a.ellent
of how material thing. appeap to operate.

ult1mate being and

ne.~

d~uJcrlptlon

But an analysis of the

of things belonga to metaplqs 108.

Of

its ver!'f nature, metaph,..1c. 18 orde* ._l!'da unde1"8tand.ing the
ultimate p.PS.Dclpl•• of . .allty.
A METAPHYS leA.L AlfALYS IS ADD DEFIlfITIOI' OF LIFE.

1'h.ua far

-

I have atkllPted to give . . . 1de.. ot What th1. the.l. ia not.

I bave stressed the question ot _thod beeaua. It 18 from that
vlewpout tbat moat m1aUJlderstUldtnp of metaph7Blce bave arlsen.
Elpeo1ally

.!no.

an,. Hal-ft.lue.

the

ts. of Kant, _taphJ'alo1 haa been denied

It 1. otten reduced to logic, the _ " d18Cua81oa

or mental o. .truota.. Ketaph7tl1cal analJ'8U. however, n••ds no
justlfleaticm When one lald... tand.a what ie meaat by 1t. ''!he u k..
phJSlcal analys1. o:t I1v1rlg th1np wb1eh I _

USing h&re haa

t],~

note. : pr1marl1,. t 1t 18 fhal.tio J trora tb1. t011_ (I) the
p:P1ta&oy of ~r-,." and (3) the valld!t,. of the ju4SJl'l$nt ot ••para....

t1c::m.
1.

'0 flay that tb18 "'18 1s 'lbomistle 1. no' to sa,. that

1t 1. not An.tot.liMn, pathes-, it 18
one .... "
H~

to Mad en1'1 the
when be ••ye

or

~ ~ he

MO"

thaD Ariatotel:1an.

would. peJibapa

It

* agreew110b

Ar18totle.

Soul 18 asol'1bed t. all bodi•• Wh... pJil1J'Jolple of
mot!. 18 1aberent 1ft thei;p 0Wl1 nature. In othel'

19
WoNS, 1 t 18 to all organio bodl.a that Aria totl.
app11es the term; to him the word .soult Ie sJl1OJl.Ymott. wlth the ward '111••• 18

To equate aaul 1I1th 11te, however, 18 to Ignore certain texts of
the ~t!ihZ!lC~ and the Bthl0a.19 HeM life 1. divine and be'1ond
the .tON of a bod,..

!bama. 18

cl~

Whatever Aristotle _ant, however, St.

to e.tablish lite as .s.entiall,. independent of'

body and able to belong .. in taet. pre-em1nentl,. .. to spIrt tual

eubatance.
2.

fo eatabliah b.1a p:r1nclple.

ot being, &r1stot1•.,

and St.

thomas toUO'Ifing him. ued hi. obaervat1ona ot the motlane 1U'ld.
change. 01' _ter1al 'th1ngs. Prom an anal.,..1. of cbenge they both
arrived at the prlno.1plea ot be1nSI

eubatanee and aCCident.

~

.ame be1llg _,. be 1.IU)(l11"1ed "acold8ntallrr wh11e remaining .8sen-

t1all,. the .ame.. A.

~el"

that there rauat alao be a
c~ t1*Ol\

one

observation and oonsideratlon reveale

OCllllDOn

su~'bane.

aubatratum tor a

to another.

being that
•

P1"CIll the •• two obse%'V&-

tiona of aco1dent and 81lhatfmt1al. abaft_. there were bom a
rea111atian

~

tbe princ!.ple of matter and .torm in oomposite

subatance. and .speo1al.l:J, and
the principles of

~

senerall7. a realIsation of

aot and potene7 extend.1ng to all being. !hus

lSwl1l1am A. Uareand. A:r1etotl••• PSnho10ifh.

s.

Sannen.8che

and 00., London, 1902. p. D. 8....::tio mucH
sama statement
in Hazamondts antol., "Aristotle's Doetrhe of "'''Xl{ a8 Biological
Princ!pl.,· P8moloslc~ ~.v1e,.., vol. V. p.l60.

l~. !l10., 11'1'1bS6,

s1dere(t""Tatir.

Mea., lO'18bl'1.

!h.e ••

wm

becCl'l-

20

tar A:r1stotl.,

st.

and

!hamaa With him.

It . . . . ', howeve,p. that tr<>m the

'

Dllme

obae:rvatlons, St.

1'hCGllll\ obtdta.4 .. d..per 1mI!gh1; 1nto the full UqlOl't
pO"beMy.

ae,.0n.4 the

p~olpl..

.t Bubstance

matter .and. tom" 8t. !b. . . recognl••d

A te _ _"

and .ld.at.ace.

I wW use l.t 1».

~

or

e.ot and

and ao.Went, o:l

Pl'inciplaa of .sa.-..

preol.. than ed.at.l1ce and one which

!Atm, •••! --

Mat tMUlaMd., t .. PUPPH.a

or

We papep,. ...... , of e:d.atins. a 8be. 8t. 1'h_ ott_ 'et1p:ea
111". sa the ~.~ of It,,1!l8 thtnga,SO l ' would be . .11 to . . . to

.ome und_"tan41ng _ What h. - - b7

tau with . . .
poi.t.

clan1;,. 1n the

h_"~,

,,,,8

,1

OOl.'lNe of the 'beal..

;'1

.

..

~

At th.!8

we .b0'al4 '17 to Nal1,•• to aome extent,

metap!q'81oa1 PJlt.ma.,. that •••• hal to1ft St.
kxt

flU. I hope to at-

th4t 8 .....
I
J

n

!h.....

the

Ooneldep tb1a

21

as

or

ptJtency to ut. 21

st. ThOJlAs says:

In another place.

Ex1ltence ( ••a.) 18 the e.otual1t,. ot every :rOlm

or na'tllre; r~ l1elthex- goodness nor huma.n1t7 18
alsn1tl.d .. twt1ng in act except 1n so ta~ as ..
• ign1.ty that it • .nat. (eam. •••• ).. It is nee..1.%7,1 theNtcU•• that tlii'"'I'CE'or exist1ng (oaae)
:1 tael.t be CompaNe! to Oi!senee wh1ch 1s otheF"1$an
it., as aot to poteac,..22

E$8~,

pP1Bc~ple

then. 1. a

1I'h1ch" au eaa.nco

~t..

of created be1nS.

st. t'hoaas po1nta out

111 whlch -that by 1Ih1chll (tUG eat) b .ud
Fil'lltot all. lt 14 aa14 or the aubatantl.al
and subatantlal. r~ constitute an

which

a

~

_tteSt

_te~1al

g.uo

~.t.

whole

ba$

eesenoe,e.g ••
t t

ex1atenee.

p~_t.l,.

1. aa14

or

It 1. "thAt by

~

the various -,.a

aate ..lal things ..

to_...

P%'~ m;!ltt~u:~

eaa.nee, the :rom 1s that by

!be iatONat1cn

upaba

or

matter make.

ot receiving eaae. Secondly
I

that 'by whtch a th1ag 1. what 1 t 1a:

b.l_.~t7"

the

hltber subataat1al ;tom no%" the
•

11

2lst. 1'hc.aaa.

8.,a.. I, SO.

I ad. I. Ad _n1_. Die.Mum

quod U ..t h~. . . . . .1" o~ltl. ~ONM et matenu, eat
ta.mel:l 1D eo aotua .t potea'tta. Q,uod qui'- m:an1teatum p,otest
esse ex ....1d.Rid. . . :NJ'UIl _te~_. 1a 'lu11:l\1l Ulva1tur
duplex 0011;>_1 t10. :Prima quid._ t01"Dli&e . , _ton... eX qu1bua
ocm.. tl1;u1t~ natUl!"& al1qua." Na~ auto. 810 oamp_ita nOD. .at
$UWll
..d ••••
otua .1,.. UnA. lpaa u.tw.-a oompafttu:r
ad 8\l'WR .... 8lout pot.tla ad actum. lubtJ"AOta .x-go matez-ia..

.s...

..t .

poalt.o ,u04 tp... ~ aultal.kt flOll m _te~1a. a4h'u.e ~t
tOl".llH a4 1p_• •ase ut poteat1u ad act_. Cb
tJlO8lattou U 8t . . . . . .,.. .., OR .:1••• _them•• 1D41...ted.

o~tl0

last • •~.8 • • • , Ii 3. 4, o. • •••at utuaUtq ....18
t081lae ft1 _ '. .oT a'&' 0.111 bQa11iU . .1 human1t... 81p1J'1...tur
in _tu, m..l p:rout .1p1t1M. . .u ••••• Oponet 111'- quod
lpaUll •••• cmapaltet\1l:' ad •••entl_ quae •• tal1ud
ipso, slout
utua a4 petentl_.

&"

.ssence

iueU, or the.elv•• ,

!I••

motu.. pl'ino1pJ.e"

make a bft1ng to be %"IIa11 the" 1.

f¥lt/up 8fJS1i'DU. where'b7 .. thbg 18.23

Ea*;8, .. a p:r1MlplA f4 be1Dg, H tha'-'Nb7 .. _tUM 111

plaoed 1n the ol'der
ceme:4 w1tsh real1
of

'"bls.

l'I.\lR take acoount of th1. prima,.". pl'1nclple

em.tenoe

41.~.he.

or _tapb;yalea J

wh1ch thla e ••••e hal.

be1ng in •• fa%' . . 1t 1.8,

u-t1.U'e,

Metaphysio•• 1t it 18 ooa-

thinge.

I" 1. not ....n.. which I. the ob 3.ot

1t 11 tlut mo4• • 1

ot

t,..

or _ ..1

athe. than 1D

_Mph".!_

~.

80

fbi. atud7

tar 881t 1. same

other •• 1•••••

!he ph11_opbJ r4 utv.Jre whleb "rltl.. Ita a_clu8.1_ 07 . . . . daR. Jlehra te the .~tll::tlA. a1at..nc. whlch &1_ CD be atkJ.Md. 'bJ ••naat!. in
OJIder , ••• t.blllh ..tea.ltteall.7 . , aN th6 objeGb. 1t at'U41...... not only " b.~ mode o~

_ow v...l» .......
_.ph,..l•• " hGWM'er. doe_ not
1N • •o1uelouln . . . . __ • 1'1_. ltD matbeatioa, 1n
••• It; '.0 ...
e.ateue 1Ih1eh ean
.t'.. ·to the

..s.t...

bu'

alAJo to

wJt1ty

the ~tl_.

"-~

t ••
be
~4 bY' . . . . .
Ue. ad l' , ... eo not to ••u.b11.h .o1etltlell1J'
Wbat a8 the 8&llt1.H it .tu41...... tIl_ _1,. fit
_tapb.78loa, tM belas te...",. to the tea pM41. . . ._.'
oNated aa4 __ .rs.al take:n u 'b4J1q ... nos-in .I'd•• t.
know tMl. . . . . . . . n ,_. e. t. __ how the,. utI'.
t . rue, teo, _~1.. .hould bow. to attala tMlr
...-. •, 018_._, u4 the ' - . . . .1.. br analog the
.o~tlb~

i

list.......X». I ~t" VIII • • , e o. * t'ble 1a emn1bu
lU1. in qu1'bua ••r •..,-.n10 ex -.uria et to.... e.t et1_
compoalt10 . . quO' e.1# et quod. e.t. In 0.,081t18 _ute. U
_tena ., to. . quo ••t petest 4101 tripl1e1ter« ,.-at_1m
4101 quo •• t 1,•• teJim& p.,.lI. q..... dat .... -.t.r1.... P.t•• ,
.t1a 4101 quo ••, lp. . . .tuB ••••n41, ••111. ., ••••• alout quo
oun1 t'uJI, •• t utu Gul'Nll41* Potest,td.am 4101 quo .at ipsa
_tUM quae Mllaqu1tur _ o_3tmO\1<me t07m&. CUJl _ _ria. ut
~tu.

23

ens_noe ot that Which ensts 1mma teP1ally j which 18

aplrttual. 24

~17

of a plant 1... mode of be1ng, tM l1te of an atUal. t

The lit.

11te

or man

aft mode. of being) the 11te

a" DIOde.

God

of behtg.

na~.sa An4

-itt.-

or an

angel. the 11te ot

1'1vena 1l1hl1 all},'\4~lIt guam~~8"

.Ie

Rill!

.lpl1'le. th1e UfJ,!I' .• but 1n u abstl'aot

the Mt\1.N of lit., then. belongs to .. stud.7 of uta-

manMl'.86

pb.)1Jl0' J lite 1. to be alvell 11l .. panloulal', nth•• than pneMl

way, the
.

c~

that

POI', to 11ve 1s ... act

to the po__" that 18 a. p.teat1&Uy all Te .ssence be.t

.IUI.noO

3.

'tbat 1••II ae¥, It.elf baa.

p~

'

,

ex1.t8.

.h'om these conelderat1cma, it should be olea%- what 1.
J~t

mdJ1t by a

ot 8eparat.lc:m..

stud.,. of the nature of

~

Metaph'1s1cs, since 1t 18 the

in their tirat pl'1ne1ples and

u ... point of i.X"J:1'R!l! athod -- prooeed by ".epa-

caWJ•• , m:uat -

l'&t.1l:lg" tt. essent1al ~ th4 accidental, the causes f'rbm the
c~ltlOi'Ul,

pl...

fhe

the pJ'!nclplea fltarJ. the th1np cGruJt:1tuted b7 pr1nel-

'1,..

J:. . .

~

at HpaftU_ 11 a. ocmlplex reaaOD.iJ18

-

Pl'OO... wbel'8Ul b7 undeNt.rW1ns tlhat doe. not account t . .. part1eu1.ut eaperi_. we .11• •0 the laloWleqa rd what does ...am:t
tor it. PO!r
,

.maple, .. be1ng 1. real PR.' be••use

~

ita essence

.

24Juque. *rttain.A P8tao..
New Yorit, 1949, PP. 22;e!'.

8Sst. Thomas t
86""",,~A

frlU~.

! .., ~.:J

!2. H!• .2bI!~ps.

I. 18, S
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'hi.

'amee

Mt-era te no mOlle than 1ta mtelllpbl. CODt. .,), 1t

or ex1at1nS. xn

1. Na1 beeausG l' bu D ut

th1G _,. . . . .-

physics aacenda to k:acMl.edge 01 tId,D.. 1. tn.1r oaWl•• , attrlbut-

t. pJllOPCtl- 8WPOU, Eve thovahthe metaphJ'alo1an
_ltm hu dlhet ope.1. . . . . taba hi. atart tra:a u

1q opel'll'!'"
begiu

1iIl1&l.781a ot

and onl.,atter Il'UOh ft.tl••t1on as-

to pr.l.tw.\lplu tbat aM Jadel*D4.ll'C of _ttel',. 11 neb. there

.,.nda
be,.

._nal th1l\sa,

OIl"

th...

whelA "abl fd

pJ'iac1pl.a

"1na u4

the c_tltutl ••

to

_)Ie

attailled.

~

u.ucte»8ilanct. to

~Mno.,

and

1s able to tUl'fl to the

,~

extent. at le.at.

0»8atd._ at all th1rJ.ga.

_._lucle w.. ftrat obapter:

1.. ., prbta..,. Ia....t_ . . ,. ah_ how a metaptqa1cal

&J)&1,.,,1a .f lit. dlf'.teN trom atl7 othe. . . .1,...18.
ph,.81eal 1m&1781a 18 s . . to be _

1Da1ght intO' "_1 th.t.asa, not

• cuw18tJltlCtl_ ffl the Jd.ad but the tJ.-ul,
I

•

•

1t7 wh• • eO'Dl'lMtloa

nih _U"

DUa meta-

~

e~71. . .

the ad..mi'a ... uUv..

1s "*4117 aM. 1n a

••:asa1 bal181.• • t kttow1e4p . . . haft . . . tU place of _ _•

Pb:plo1 a.ul.J'.d.8 1. the ftb.leR1'GhJ'" fit the aeleu. . moft

1t 18

-

Jl1J11

the NlMbbg papa

aft 111~

bJ

wbat

to 1M.l. .t. wha:t; 1t

18.
8.

•• haw .ea bow it 1. po.elb1. to haft pb.11oaopb1oal

knO'Wle4&..~J.'
fle1'1t

thaa mdvocal ••••_'lal det1Jd:tlou.

tM

of ••paNtle will lea. us to an "'~!ll~ knowledge·

niltUft

3.

Judg.

or

the

of 111'••
~

method 18 Ut 1nteU1g1ble 1Bductl_ boll thoe_ th.l

25
that al'e evidentl,. liv1ng.

1"b18 1nduc\1ve appl'QaCh to the meta-

physical probl_ of 11t$ gives
\fh1ch by sepal'1lUng causes

U$

tPOm

a basU in fJx.p$plence trom

OGlld1t101'U1 we w111 be able to

attain a knowledge ot what perta1M to 111'. as such. as a manner
of

en. tina_

CRAPTER II

!!l! Start!!!i

Po1n~:

!B! PhYSical

W.o~l~

Prom those things that are eVidently living, we ean
understand to whIch things it belongs to live and to
which It does not belong to live. It 18 eVident,
how.v.,.." that to live belongs to an1mals. For. 1 t
1s said (.De Elantla) that 111'e is aanlteated in
anbtals. '"'"'fh'e"f~, it 1s. accordIng to thIs that it

1s neoesaal"J to d1au1ngulsn the 11v1ns

t~

the non-

living" namely, 1n that respect in which aninaals are
sa1d to 11ve. this aspeet 18 the eme under whIch
11te 1s tint ot all manifested, and tmder. which the
last traoes of 111'. "main. -For,., say that an
animal 11YeS, ttnt ot all When 1 t begins o~ 1 kelt
to have motIon, and the animal !sjudged to live just
so long as such _Uan appear. in It. When, however.
it no longer has any motion of 1tselt, but is moved
only b,- another, then the an1mal 1S said to be dead
on acoount of a tailing of lite !II 1
flOlEllENT AS INDICATIVE OF LIFE.

fb.el"$ 1s no better v1ndica-

tion ot the real-value 01' metaphysio. than to follow step-b7-step
•

that induotion whereby the principle. or metaphysios are gleaned
from expert.nee of the world -- whether

~

pet-Sonal experience

1St • Thomas,!_ ~., I, 18. 1 OJ R••p(mdeo dlcendum quod
ex his quae man1f".$te V1vunt, aoeipere POSfiJUDlUS q'Uo:rum sit
vivere. et quorum non .tt nvere. ViveN autem Mnlteste animal1
bua conventt. Dlottur enta, (De .l-!lantlB) quod. V1ta 1n an1mallbua
manttest. est. Unde secundum nIue! oponet dlstlngueN viventla
a non vlventibu8, secundum quod animal!a dlcuntur vlvere. Hoc
aut_ est in quo primo :man1testatur vita, at in quo ultIma rG""
manet.. --Primo autem dloimus animal vi veN I quando inclpi t ex
Be motum habere, et tamd1u judlcatuJt animal vi vere J quamdiu talls
matus 1n eo apparet J quando vero jam ex Be non habet allquem
motum, sed movetur tantum ab all0, tunc dioitul.- animal mortuum.
per defectum vItae.
26

2'7

To talk about the nature ot 11fe is meaning-

or that of another.

less without having analyzed what lt 1s
they 11ve.
ing the

1:!!

l;lvIn~

things whereby

Suoh an analysis or oQ1l81deratlon consists 111 examin-

tOl"!lD$

ot l1fe that are objects of our experience in order

to det.mine the principle and source ot the vital activIty.
In the

!hore are three p088ibl.approaehee along this line.

tl:rst place, thel'8 1. the scient!.t who scours the sea-bed looking top

the 81mpleat torm of lit. J he t.els that greate:v torms

of 11t. aJIG onl,. elabo:ftLtions or att\oebae.

file maIn ditf'ioulty

with such an approach 18 * aa Anstotle points out, that there

are many 1;b1ng8 which . . would be haN. put to to deo1dewhether

they are allve or not, or

whethe~

they are plant or animal.

Secondly. there i8 the ra1mer idealistic ph11osophei1' who con-

side,.... lUe in ita tullest as 1t would be found. in God; only
secondarily does he 'then apply Ullte" to creatures.

l1l'1l.ess,
•

however, what i . known ot the lite of God 1s known. only after and
because

~

knowledge

or

the lite of creatures, such a philosophex-

buildaeastles in the sky and has no hope of discussing :reality_
The third path 18 tollowed bJ Anatotl. and St. Thomas and con-

siats in examining lite as 1t 1s "most evident" to us.
is movement that gives us the

~1rst

manitestation

o~

Since 1t

lire and

sinoe 1t 1s lack ot movement that in the last analJsis torces us

to jud.ge that this th1ng 1. no longer l1ving, 1t 1a from an unde
standing or motion itselt, oZ that speoial ''We of motion we call
"actlv1ty,~

and of

tbe principle and source

or

motion and

28

activit,.. that

TI8

oome to understand. something ot l1re.

Such an approach to the problem as 1s outlined above, renders

-

Irrelevant a dlscussion alang the lines of M. Adlerts Problem
ot
,
S;reo1es.~

Dr. Adler 18 interested in determ1n1ns the number of

dlttel'ent species of things:
one

OJ;J

whether the 1nan1.mate constitutes

several specle'i whether the number of souls 1s more than

fbere is great difficulty 1n deciding such questions, as
Adle~ quotes Ar1stot1e to indloate: 3

th1"8e.

Nat'tlre proceeds little by little rl"OlD. 111"e1888 to
animal 111'. in such a way that it 18 1mpoaslble to
detenune the e:aot 11ne ot demfu-catlon, nor on which
side thereot an 1ntel'Jnediate :foa should 11e. IJ.'hUB.
next atter lUeles8 tb.1nge in the upward scale comes
the plant I and of plants one will ditter tram another
as to it. amount ot apparent vi tallty.... Indeed.
there ia observed 1n plants a continuous scale ot
ascent towarda the animal. So, In the sea, thSl"e are
eeX'ta1n objects concerning Which one would be at a
loss to detem1l1b Whether the,. be animal 01" vegetable
.... In regard to sensibility, some animals give no
indioation Viha"OttTel" of it, whllst others indicate
It di.tinctly.... And so throughout tbe entl~e
·
animal scale there 1a a graduated d1t'te:rent1ation 1n
amount or Vitality and in capaeity tw motion.
But what Dr. Adler does show and what Aristotle points out 1. the.

there

-

aN

olasa1f'1oations t

plant and animal.

The qual1fications

01' these elasses are known from those members which give evidence
01' these qual!tles, so that a taUure to place this or that thing

S.ortlmer J.. Adler. ~ Problem of Sp'cles..

and Ward, 1940.

3 lbid •• p. lOS:

4-22.-

-

,

--

lie." York, Sheed

Anstotle, Hist. An1ma11um, VIII, 1, 588b
-
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In one definIte clus 18 due to Ignorance ot the nature ot that
thing.

~$

_ana that animal 11te 1s d1atlngu1sbable tl'Ql pIaD.-t.

that husn lite 18 distinguishable

tl'ODl

antsl.

Above all, it

indicate. 'that there 1e a distinction of lite fram non-11te.
sequentl,., the Nault ot our investigation Is not to give

WI

Can
a

rule wheNb,. we _,. decide what 10" ot l:J:vlng thing 'bbl. Ol- that

material individ.ual 1s.
zoologlat.

'lh1a 18 the

.0*

of the blcloglstoJl'

Rather... are interested 1n determing What belongs

to lite .. auoh.

10

that wbat ... • ..,. w111 appl,. to lite wherever

W. begln, then, wIth life .. it i8 moat evident,

it Is found.

and ... atteDQ)t to un4eretand ita lIJ:t;1mate nature. !he tint
avid....... obsel"Wt about 11te 18 It. connection 1If1.th motion .•
,

It 1. not, however. an: type ot _tlon wh1ch !ndicatea lite.
Mottan laanalogoua ..a It 1. found 1n things.

!he pria17 &nalo-

gat., motion 1n the atJ'1ot senae, 18 the utuallty of that whlch
•
4
e:.Uats 1n po_no,. and 1n 8. ta. ... 1 t 18 1n potenoy. fbJ.8 type

ot motion 18

the p1*OOe.s
itself, the "'8l'7 ~lt1on hom • state
,

of potcm.eJ' to
OWl

tha~

ot act. Its °realit,.· ocnalsu 1n

the

cont1nu

aotuaUz.tlon td a pot.Cl" lta "al1t,. 1. tbat .. o.t a th1ng

..hieb 1. on b

_,. to bfl1ng· aotual. and in so tar u

"em the .aT' and has not .. yet been actualized.

1',.1,

only

!hle type of

motlon oea••• when the new pel-teotion 1a gained, 1u real1t7.

then, 18 of the low.,

.

t,"t

1t 1s tM aetual1t7 of an 1ap$rrect

30

being, that 1.s t 01" a being in potency. 5

is "beeom1ng" l"athel' than "being."

..nse.

Motion, in thi.

'fhus.

III

building while 1t t.

being bullt 18 .....
in tlerl;
Ii. 1t 1. lmpe:r1'ect .,1th1'88P80t to tbe
plated bu1141n6 which utat.

reault of

801111

.elf motion

OJ'

!!! e....

0<.'0.-

8uoh motion. 18 al1f&,.a the

otb... activit,.-, Whether that other aot1v1t7 be 1ts0m8'SbS1\8 else..

It 18 a1••,.. the :result of some

otb.e:r utlY1t'1, beoauae ita "alit,. OOlUllst. pHc1se1,. in the
prooe.8 Wbel'8by. thing 18 reduced .tram poteno7 to aet.

And noth

ing is redueed t . . poteacy to ..., except; by sOIIethUlg alreadT in

act. 6

In othe~ ..0"-. 'ih18 type of motion 18 alwa,. caused Jlby

anoi;hel'."

1'IbatCtvel' 1. llOVed 18 moved. b,. something other.

the ty.pe of actlon to 1Ih1ch

st.

This 1

'l'hQ1.'QaS Mte" when h. sa,..:

-wh

It 1. moved only by another, then It 1. said to be dead. 8 '1 14ot1.
1n tshe .tftct ••nse, tbIm. the act ot that which exists in potene7, 18 ...ld ot n.on-ltving things

moved b7

.ome~

in

80

:t"ar aa the,.. a~ ~1ng
•

e1C1.. theNtO,., It 18 not an eum1nat1on. of

th1a t,-pe 01" motlon that will lead us to an un4eNtand1ng or lite

A ••con4al'J' analoga" o£ motion, 1n a wide ••nseot the teN
•

1

1

t

l

"'

Is,... ftlatllU,
!. a., .1, 18, 3 ad 1: ..... motus eat actus
@8t:'J aotuJ lmper-teotl, s.ilicet u1atent1e
poten1n

mobilia....

t1a ...

Sst.

thorau, .lD.. VII ,Meta •• leot. I, 118'18.

natul'all'ber pl'iol' Vt

potin,r..

.lotus aut••

Bt a1mpl1citel' loquendc priOJt
tempore. quia non mewetuX" potentia ad aotum n181 pel" ens aotu.

7S t • thomas ..

1 .. .!a-I

I, lS, 1 0 ..
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1s more properly oalled "aetlv1ty."B
to indicate the self-possession

or

the term uactlvltT' 1. used

tb1s typo ,of motIon..

Activit,.

18 analogously called -motion" because, as motion in the stl'1ct;
seneff i8 the aot

ot the one moved, act.!. vlty or operation 18 the

aot of the ona act1ng. 9 Activity, however, is the act of a being
which exiata in aot and 1n so far

mean1ng of the Mrm - ••U ..tn;Otion. u

haa Ita

it

88

i8

motion and to 1 t8 teN.
It.elt, it 18 sald

'0

!he te. ·.sir....motion .. "

1t reters botb to the sO'UJlCe of' the
When a. being

11ve.

or

1,.elf' begins to move

Now. the aCRl!'Ce of the motion 1.

able to be only the aatint,. of the behlg, it this

motion

W:r'$

fh1a 18 the

fbis type of' motion, act1vity,

SOU". 11'1th1tl the being ita.lt.

tben, baa two reterences t

in aot.

80u~e

ot

motion in the striot sense, It would be caused :t:POm

wIthout, and we would not have an example of' .elt-motlon. What
1s meant leonl1 thi8, that a dist1net1on m.uat be made between
•

motion1n a being that 1s HOelved freD. outside (and this ... have
called "motion 1n the 8t.101; sensed) and motion that ia trona. the
being It".l1' (and thi. we bave oalled

otlvlt,.·).

If ..

!hi. 18 a

minimal d1stlnotlon o£ lite t . . non-ltte, but it 18 an important
II

t

11

••

81 t. ~omaaf

1_ !!., z.
!houm., I._ 1'h., I,

lS,

a a4

1.

9St.
18, a a4 11 unde quia motua eat
actual mobill. ,. ••cUndi"""..ot!o inquantum eat actus operantis, d1el ....
tUt- actus
ex haG 81m111tudlne, quod stout motu•••t actua
mob1118, ita buJuamcd1 e.etl0 •• t aoWe agentia, 11ee' l'ltotus att
actus imperfeot!, 8cl110' exlatentl. 1n potent!a, bujuamod1
autem. actio 81t aotus pert"'!. 14 est existent!. 1n aow.

.jus,

as

ACTIVITY.

We have pointed out that sel.t-motlon or actt vi ty

18 the sign ot lite.

strict s.ns. has it'

Seoondly, we have 8.en how motion in the
80\U'Ce

either in another extr1nBlc motion

<as when one billiard ball in motion imparts motion to another
billiard ball)

01*

in an aot! vi t7 (as when a 1iv1nS being impart.

motion to a material thlDg)..
typGs.l0

F1Nt

or

Activit,. itself. however. 1. ot two

all, there 1s the actinty that has ita

SOUNe

in the agent, but proceeds from that apnt and produoes an effect
outside of that agent.

'fh1s type at aotlvlty 1e oalled "tMD.-

sienta ft thi. i . the activ1t,. whioh 18 ot the predioament "actian.

Aotion i8 the perteotlon
the agent It••lt:

or

8;01;10 ••t

the

!!

thins

uted upon. rather than 0.1
,aaso.11 .u weh, with regard to

ita term. this action 18 not distinguished from motion in the
strict ..mae when coneemed with _terial th1nga.

Th1s transient

actlon 1. the pas8ion "auf'tered" by the patlentJ it i8 the ohange
or motion whioh 1s produced in a patient but cona14ex-ed a8
r

_• •••

lOst. !hemal, S1.'lllest. i1'l!. do l'otentia Dei, III, 15 OJ
Duplex ••, .otiol quae'lUi qUae conal.II' In-ypao agent. at eat
pe:rt.o~lo at actus .sen'b1a. ut inteUigere. veUe, 8t huju;mod! J
quaedu vere quae egNd1tn.u:- ab agente in patlen. ext:r1naeoum .t
est per.te-otl0 .t actus patient!8, .lout oaletaoere, moveN, .t
huju8lDC41.

118t. fhomaa, In I ~nt., <60, 1, 1 ad It Operati0 enim agent!. qua.dam EUJt ut"nua!eu 1n affeotum ••t haec ppopr1e aot10
vel pae.l0 d!cl~,.t tal! actionl .emper respondet • conveNO
pas.lo, undo 1nyen1~ caleraetio aotio et eale.taotl0 passlo" et
Similiter ereatic aot10 .t oreatic pas.10.
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received. tram. the agtmt~12

!heN are two conclusions . . may d:raw

from thi.:

1.

!ran.lent aotion considered in ita t1na1 cause 1a the

same .. motlon in the atMet senseI that 18, 1t 1. the act ot an
impert'ect belng. the pel'teotion of the th1ng moved.13

e.

But, tl"8n81.nt aotian conaidered 111 1ta et.tio1ent cause,

namel,., .a Pl'Oo••dtng from a being, 1s dlat1ngu1shed:
18 a tranam1tted aotion (aa motion in the _':riot ••nae)

.1the:. it

0,.. it

ftda latter belongJ to a lIving being.

initiated action.

is

And

78t, beoaue. vanalent aotion belonss to both living and nonllvlns th1nga. 1t 18 not thi8 t1P8 01 utlnt, that repl"esenta
the natuJ.le of 11:t••

!here 1a a second t1P8 01' aotiv1t'1 Whioh baa Ita sOUI'Oe in
the apnt and NJDa1na

agent it.elt.

.1~

the agent,

~l"t.cting

none but the

!hie aotlv1t'yl' called "immanent actlon," it •
•

i-

12St • Thomae, 8.
t 1, 41, 1 ad a. • • ., actio .ecundum
Pl"imam nOJl~nl. imp_I on.e. imporlat o:-lg1nem motus. Siout en1m
motue, PJ'OUt •• t in mobIl! ab allquo. dicltup pU810, ita arigo
ipalus aotuB, s&oundum quod 1nciplt ab alIa et term1natul" in 14

quod movetur. vocatur actio.

lS.e • Xote 9.

.!t.

l'st •. fhoaaa,
J)~i. !!. V...l.te. VIII. 6 o. Re.·
pondeo die.MUlI, q~lupl"x est acl!o.
quae pl'ocedit ab
agente in l'em e:Ue:r1orem. quam tranemutatJ et haec eet slcut 11lUldna" J quae et1am Pl"OPne actio n<*1natur. Alia vep£) actio
est, quae non pt-ooedlt in rem extel'10relll, ..4 atat tn "4'P8Q,,~~te
ut pe~.ctl0 ip.ius J et haM proprio dlo1tUl" opeJ!&:tlo, et hUt . .,>.
e.t .1out lucere.
'v''''
•..
, . ,\
,:.> \

sa

ever, there 1s a distinct10n to be made.

Pb-st, theN 18 that

action wh10h begins and end. in the agent but is the action ot
one put of the agent upon anothe%' paR_

!h1e action 1s l!1J1Ulnent

in that 1t Nma1na within the agent, but 1t 18 t1'8.l'Ullent in

ettect, 1n that one part aeta upon another.

!hi8 t»8

or

1ta

aotlon

1s moat ev1dent 1n _terial llving thlnsa wbeNin, tor example,

a d08 »lQves hbtselt

t~

place to p1808.

meaning ot "se1t-move:r.oth.~

one part

or

~

1s the pr1mal'7

a materlal thing move. an-

part ot itaelf.

Seoondl7, tbeN 18 tha1i aotlv1t7, or opel"8.tlon, whioh hal no
tu.l:-ther end than tru. operation 1t.elt .15 !'hue, to ••• 18 an

operation and an end. in It.eU. !hi. t7P8 ot activlty -

opera-

tion, and e.pec1all,. tbat opentlon wMoh 1. an. end 1n it.eU 113 the true indica tl an of l1re.
OPBRA.!IOIl AND llA'fURB.

t1al17 11" one

or the.

~

th1nge aN sald to d1tt.it e ••en-

baa a aet of operat1ona 1fh1oh the other

does not have. 16 fhi8 pl'1nclple 18 founded upon a ve1'1 baa!e
I

t

lSs t • fhomas, l)l DC ..ta._", le'oih a, f18es: QUia ena dix.rat
quod. opue .at t1n1a. po•••1 ulqu1a oNdere, quod hoo e .• set vel'UJll
in orm1bua. Sed ipse hoo NlIlOvet, d.1eena. quod qu.al:"UlD1am. aot1varuza potentlal"tUll ult1mwJ t*1n18 .at solus Qua potentIa., et non
allquld opel'atum pe~ aotionem. potentlae J sleut ult1mul .tint. potenti.. viaiva. est Vi.lo, at praeter • • non tit a potentIa

vislva allq.uoct

opus

operatum.

1GSt • fh0Dla8. II Oont..... Gente., 6S I l'nven1nsua enim allquaa
lnt*lmaa tONA$ quae In nuX!am. ope:ratlonem poasunt rd.8i ad quam
Be extendunt q.ual1tatee quae sunt d1sposltlones matel-i.e, ut
oaUdum. frlg1dum, hum1dum. slocum, mrum, deuaum, grave at leve,
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our awareness ot the dIverslty among activitIes.

experienoe:.

Without. going through a complete explanatIon of the hylomorph1c

composition of material thlngs, it 1s suff1cient to point out

that accidental and substantial ohanges ahow a

matt8~/form

cam-

posltlon in wMch substantial tona detel'"mines ott specities the
paP'ticular essence or natu1'tt whIch the thing possesses.

substantial

to~

This ,

1. a caUSe ot the thing'. existenoe and actual-

Ity.l"

But th1ngfB existing in aet aN able to exel'olse aotlcna

only in

80

tar aa th_,. aN 1n Ht .. 19 A thing 1* not able to aot

1n that "spact in whioh 1t 1s only 1n potency;

1t 1n potency, :1

does not have the p.rfection) and a thlng U not able to give
wbat 1t does not have.

S1nce the 'being 1. able to aot 1n so tar

as 1t 1s in act, 1t. aotlvlty must tollow the mode of" being and
I

f

1

l

I

at hi. atm11l. 1 .lout forma. .1...nto~J unde lata. aunt torma.
omnlno mater1al.es .t total! te.t- !.mmersae materIa.. Super' has In.
v8nlunwr t01"!l:lla8 l'd.xtorua eol",Po1'UDl" quae ..... operantul!' • to .. vi".·

tute ...... qua. consequ1tlU' .arum apeei_} slout ao.a..a trahlt
rerrwa. Supep haa lte1"Wl inveniuntUl" aJ.iquae tormae quarwa
operat1one8 extendunt't.ll? ad allqua operata que exeedunt virtutem
qualltatum pra&d1ctarwa, quamna quaUtate.• praed1ctae orgaa1cae
ad harum operatlone. d••• l!"Vlant sieut aunt anima. plantal"Um••••
ct. a180, .sue',t. P1'l? ~~ ~ Si1~t. Orea.t. art. 11,0.

!h.,

l'1st • !homa., 1.
I-II. 179, lad 1: Ad pl"lmu:m, ergo
dicendum q\lod pl'Oprla-roftlll. uniuscUlusque tac1ens 1psum esse in·
aetu, e8t; priDciplum opent1on1& p:ropl"1ae .jus •

Mea'. p1i'·ageM
.:1!. V.Pirk,
VIII
e _~e. t
ac ones sec'Un",UD'1 quuu sun

.... lest • ~~.,
tlUvvm exi 8ovnv.. aeu po••un

Botu ••••

'A,6

I
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aotuality which 1t hae. 19 !buB 1t 1s that an agent produces
things 1n Ita own 11kene.8J and the aotlv1t!e. ot a thing, in
genel"8.1, manl!"est the kind ot thlng 1t 1•• 20 BEtOQuse of th1s,

we are able to know a

~h1ng

tram the

It tn!tlates.

aot1~tles

!bereloH. just on the pUl"81,. experiential level .... are able to
show an essentIal d1fterence between two things when we are able

to indicat. two

l~uelbl.

set. of activitie..

The evident con-

clWJlon .tJ:'Ola theaa cons1derations 18 that a living thing di:tteJIB
hODl a non.l1ving th1ng ,Pl"Nuely because 1t has a set ot activi-

tl•• (ll'l111-n8nt aotlona) 1th1ch are not :t0Wld 1n

What the••

aotlvltl•• are and what

tn.,.

fA

non-llving thing

mean 11'111 be eD.l1t.1.ned

later.

Ravingooncluded. however. to dltte"nt

m,.,.

of beinS

001'-*

reapond1ng to dUte,.nt .eta of actt vi ti... there yet veaalna to
decide 1n 1I'ba' thi. dttteNnce ot "types" conaists.

ph.r who holda that all things

aN 0041..

fo a, philo.

and what 1. not a bod,.

18 nothing, the .cure. 01* theae l:aaanent activitl ••• It
:Jl1lUIt alao be a bod,..

On the oontftl'7. h.eve",

st.

"al,

!!l0lQU points

out that it 18 not be_use thia b0d.7 1a a bod,. that it 18 living,

.

1'h.,

19St • !'bOlla.,S.
1, 76, 1 (q nlud enba quo primo 1l11quid op.ra~t eat-tol"lU. ei\UI cui operatio attr1bultul'-. ••• lit
hu1ua ...t10 .att qula nihil aglt rd.al .eoundum quod •• t aotoJ

unCl. quo aliquid 8at aotu" eo agit.

Oosn1~~:·~=-~o!Ip:;::rra'W~t~l~:!l:U;:-s!!!:it:.~e;:a

modo en1m.

pensatuJ-.

opel'fltlonia et apeel. _tUtura at qual!t•• virtut!.
Vlrtws va.o natul"&m rei m.on.atl'at.
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1t 1s because It 1. 4 certain type ot body -- or &lse,
all bodies, as such, would be 11v1ng.21 !h1a 1s a basic expel'1rathe~,

enc. and 1ntult10ll, and po1nta to a d1venaitz at principles to
explain dltt'e7GXlC.s ot k1nd.

!hat 18, me. tter ot :1tselt 18 inde.

terminate J to expla1n the d1vel"s1ty of material things _. the
Na1 essent1al div.Nity -- it 1e ne-oea8ar.r to reoognize a prin-

ciple whereby matter 1. actually a ceJltaln k1nd of material thinS
!1'hat by wh1ch a matenal thing i. ac'bua1ly a determinate type at

being, 18 ita act,

01'

its torm.sa fhus, in a livins thing_ a

tol'!ll8l., actual element 1B needed. to exPlain Ita eBsential dIfference trom a non-living th1ng:

thia 18 the soul, a non-corpa:.al

prinolple of beingwhlob. i. the act

at .. living

body and thua the

tt:re' pro1nclple ot 11t••S3
U1

21st. fhomas, 8. !b., 1, 76 1 C: Q.uamv18 aute. al1quod eorpoe.lt e ••• qu'Od4ll prlncip UtI. '91.tae, sleut cor est },):rincipi
vItae in animal!, tamen allquod. oorpus non poteat ea •• pp1nlum
pnnclplum Vitae. ..nit••tum .8t en1a quode.uH' princlplum vitae
vel viven8, non o<.Yftvenlt oorpol"l ex hoo quod eat corpus; alloqu1n
cmme OOJ'P'WI easet "lvena aut pr1nclpl_ vit.... Conv.nit 191tu.r
a110u1 co~pori quod 81t vi_ne, "e1 .tlam prinoipium vItae, P*J·r
hoc quod eet tale cOl'PW'. QUod. aut... est acw tal., habet hoe ab
al1quo principl0, quod 410Itur aotull -Jus. An1ma 191tur, quae .a
prim'ta prlnolplua '1It.e, non .at carpue, .ed corporis actus.

pull

1

21st • Thoma., In VII JIt.D_, leo1;. S, IlBVB: 'Ohde patet, quod.
pPioz- quam mate'Ri"; et e1;lam eat magis .nIl quam lpaa, .
quia pPOptel' quod Ullumquodque .t 111ud mag18. Ma t.ria eute. non
tit ens aottl nisl pel' tormam. trnd.e opon8t quod t02'm& sit magi.
ens quam mat.~la.
23A.zt1stotle ,De ~f 4lSa 27-412b SI Hence soul 18 the first
aotuality o£ a naliil'ilOdy having 1n it the capacity ot I1te ••••
the soul w:111 be the first aotual! ty of a natural body furnished
,,1 th organa.. (All tremsle. tlonlJ ot R!. An1maare J" A. 8mi th '. ,
.:f'·Ol"Jla •• t
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All that we have dotemined so tar i. that the typltp.ng

principle ot body cannot itself be body.
afforded by the judsaaent of separation:
be a prIncIple ot

11te,

ltv1ng, doeB

Ol'

!hiB 18 the inslght

"It 18 evIdent that to

!!2! belong

to a bod,. Pl'e-

cl••1,. as body, otherwise 8"$:.ry body would be living or a principle ot 11.teJ theretoN, It belongs to some body which 141 living,

or even whIch 1. a prlnclple of llte, tor thSa rea.on that 1. t is

a detln1te tn>e ot body.pt.

theretore. the reality ot a non-

oorporeal element 18 arTdved at bJ recognizIng the

~nablli~l

ot

corporeal element. to eJC;plam all the obs.nations.
In ocmoludlng that the souro. of vital. aottrit1•• must be

other t.han materIal, we leave open the poaalbUlty that there

existB some 11te that i8 completely independent ot matter. Although the judgment of 8epal"&tlon sh01l8 that the aOUJ-ee of lite

ls non-corpoNal, 1t does not posit the existenoe of an inmaterla
I t .

living beins_

..

And yet, trom our analysis ot a material lIving

belng, concluding, as We do. that the soul muat be non-corporeal,
we have metaph;yalcal oertainty

that 111"8 ls not closed to spirit-

ual be1.nga, if there 8.relm,._

FUrth.";t acme or the same evidence

1fh1ch led

WI

to make th.!. JudSment of ••paratlon, al.so

1~1s

-

us

to decide whether there a.ctually ls Iml" lite whioh 1s Intrinsical
1'1 independent ot matter.

now

'Por, 8mce the actlvlties ot a thing

from it. nature. we a" able to know that nature troa an

39

analysis 0:1: the activities.

A:nd sinee, as we have al:ready pOinte

out, a differenoe of activities indicate. a ditference or

it

nat~s

any set ot activities which Is intrinsically inde-

W~ di8eove~

pendent ot matter, we would have to posit a nature, a type o£
living, itself .1ntl"1nsleall'1 independent ot matter. SS

It 1s with

these principles 1n m1nd that in the third chapter we will take.
up en examinatlonand an.o.lysis of the various activities which

are manifested by living things.
SOUL AS PlmfCIPLB OF LIn.

All aotlv1t1•• of any being

whatsoever proceed, ... f1"Ol1 the1. ultimate
.horeb,. tbl. be1q 1. made actual.

40\11'108 J

f:raa that

!h18 p1"1nc1ple of aotual1

1s oalled fltona," In 11"f1ng beings, 1t 1. oalled fl a ou1,,·

eoul 1. the ultimate

p~olpl.

ot activity at

t,.

!he

anz living th1ng:

it meal'll simpl7 that the substantial torm of that tb1ng "presen

tbe aotual1aatlon

or a

potentiall,. living belng.26 !b1s'1mpl1ea

twoth1nga:

1.

Soul 18 the pJ'1noiple oE lUG only in thoa. be1nge which

are compoaed of _tal' an4 tom, an,. aubsiatent fORa would. 1teel.t
be an ultimate principle of vItal aotlv1'!•••

2. !be acu.1 1s the
1

j

~l:t1Jlat~

pr1nelple otv1 tal aottv! tl•• J

".t

SSst. fh~., II CantJi'a
68: 'O'nUmquodque en1a operat
aecund'um quod est;
eu]ua operatio exced.1t condltlonem
mat.~lae. et Ipsa, seoundum dIgn1tatem au! eaae, auperexcedlt
mater1am..

una. row

2Gsee Note 24.
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a compoa1t. being ot necesslty needs oertain Rrox1mate principles
thl'ough which the soul acts.

These proximate principles ot aetlv

Ity may be elthel' material or immaterial:

matel)tlal, as the organ

ot the eye) immaterial as the power of sight itself -- aa we shal
see.
The tact that the soul 1s the form
;;

ot the

body p:reoludes

any

qUestion .a to a dualiam. a8 Ragusaa puts its

!be soul 1s not me:rely operat1ona11y present in the
body as In Plato where it pl..,.. the role or mover to
mO"!!<i f but 1t .18 existentIally pre.ent as put or the
ol"'pru.smts aetual constitution. It reduce. the baN
potential1t7 of' the _terial bod.,. into a posItive
aetuaUtl_ !b'wI 1t 1. usele•• to que.t1on whether
the soul and body are one, since together they torm

a complete

.uba~tlal un1Oft.87

Consequently. we . ., <terlne a little
by

·aelf-acwer. 1t

In

0Jl$

moN 018&1'1.,.

what 18 JI'.leant

senSe it; i. not true that; the soul moves

the bod."

81110e it 1a the bod,.'s torm, and not properly d18t1t1ct
(a11ud quid) t1'Oll 1t. It Is, we repeat, a constituent,

not a

on

move~.ae

the other hand .... actual principle, the soul does move the

body 1n the .ense of

beine

the

ultimat.

IIOUM"

tle. that are attributed to an animate body_
the

.cul,

of all the activI-

Ae "glver

or

EUllse,"

then, 18 the baais foX' the llv1ng body-i. existence !!

27,_ J. Ra.SU8aa. !he SUbstance

The0it at Kind !!!! O.onte!!EOX'-

.!£l Ft.mCtl,ona1~sm. ~ ~.,'S'I. p:-r3.
P.

l:~~·

D. Sertl11anges.

!at ;Fpundatlon~ 2t. T!lom1.t~~ f h11o,s,o;2hl
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}.lv1nS and as able to perform vital activities.

As Aristotle

says:
rhe 80ul 1. the cauae Ol" sauroe or the 11Ylng body ..
The tarmIJ cause and source have many senses. But the
80ul 1. the calle. of It. body alike 1n all three senses which we expllcl tly recognize. It 1. (a) the
sourca or o"iS1n of movement, it 1s (b) the end, it 1s
(0) the eseene. or the whole livIng body.
!hat it 18 the last. 1s clear, tor, 1n eve~h1ng
.Ju.ence 1s identical wlth the pound o£ its being,
and here, in tbe case ot 11vtng th1.nga1 their being 1s
to live, and, of their beIng and their l.1 v1ng the III oul
in them 18 the caUBe or souree. S9
tl'l.$

Ar1atotle, ot course, 18 taking ftesaenee" 1n 1t. strict senee 01'

that which const! tutea a being 1n 1 ta specie.s.

~.

specific torm

ot a living thing, ita soul, Is such a pl'1r&elple.
It 18 to be noticed that "soul" Is introduced only to be

len, relatively, in the

baokg~.

Aa we pointed out. Itaoul"

is proper only to beings compoaed of matter and torm..

soul does not belong to lite

11ving th1ngJs"

d

!heretore.

.uoh. but only to thoae liaterial

1'0 lIu17 that soul belonga to lite as such is to

PM-judge the poea1b111t,. of a soul-le•• 111'. of an illlU.tel'1al

be1n.g.

A8 a matter 01' taet, we wUl. 1nvestlgate soul ...life be-

cause our experI.noe ls ooncemed w1th that J but baving determined wbat it _ana to 11ve 111 material beinp, because we have

al:Nilady - ••papated" lIfe tl'ODl matter,
soul-less lite as well.

OUl'

conclusions w111 entbl'ao
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To conolude:
1.

1'he points brought out in this ohapter are not new or

dlffioult to und,&xaatand by one vereed 1n St .. ThomAS t philosoph,..

2.

I have tried, however. to stress the exiatentiaJ. and

experient1al basis ot the prinoiples we find 1n our first analyS18

at living thtnga.
3.

next

All thea. pl"1nolples are neoessary

pa~

of the the.is J

undepatand the natuM

or

tb~,.

r_ understanding the

wl11 be applied in ou:r

a living th1ng.

atte~'t

to

OHAP1'ER III
!be Intul t1on:
..........

file Grades
of Life
...........
.r't ....................

But since the mode. of lite are mul tipl., if only ane
or them 1. in a thing, tbat th1ng is said. to be lIving
and an1.mawd. Ute, he lAx-iatotlj] says, shows 1tselt
in ton,. mode. * (1) a8 InteUeotual) (2) aa sensitIve)
(5) a8 the cause of motion or reat in space} (il) as the
eau.. of tbe mo1;iOll8 of tak1ng ttotLrisbment. dec.,. and

growth.

Be d1et1ngu1shea anl7

the..

tour modea, al-

though he baa alNaci7 dlst1ngu1ehed t1ve :main typel of

vItal. actIvity. and this beoaU8e he 18 thinking here
be1n~h...
The ap·
petitive power, wb1ch makes a titth t1P8 of vitality,
does not, howe.,.r, ~l,. a die tine t grade 01' 11ving
be1n8. tor 1t &lft.,.. acoompanies sensation. 1
and now ot the· degree of a.n.1mate

MAtERIAL LIVING mINOS.

In the preVious ehapkr we d1s-

covered that ImmaneD" actIvity,

01'

opel'Qtlon, 1s the sign or life

In this ehapter ...e 1dJ.1 anal,... d1.tferent kinds of operatlC11fw1 t

the purpo••

or

dete1'lldn1ns the preo1•• natlU'$ ot the be1ng that 1
•

lat. f,fhCIIIIU. la II de ~t leo1;. 8, #2M-2551 Sed cum
multIplex sit modus vival. aI unus tantum eowm insit alieu1,
d1cl'tUl" 111u4 vlvlIl'lS et anl:matutJh Ponl' auhm quatuor modoe
vivendi. quorum unua tUft pel'" intellect_, .eoundua per ••nsum,
tertlwa pet- motum et atat;w.a local••, quanua per motum al1ment1,
et deore_nt1 .t augmenti. Ideo aU1;_ quatuor tantum modo. POlll t
Vivendi, oum supra quinque genera operation:um an1mae posuer1t,
Quia hie intend1t dIet1.nguere modos vivendI, seoundum gradua
vlventlum. qui 41at1ngueNntlut .ooundum haec quatuor ••• ., Appetlt1vum. autem, quod est quintua praeter baM qu.e.tuor, non tacit
al1quam diveditat_ 1n grad1bu8 vivent1_. liam ub1cum.que est
.ensus! ihi •• t et "ppet1tua. Of. alao In 148 Sensu at Senaato.
1eot. :1 13• (the banalatlon and numbei=rng 'i,ie' :freD.
'oaiirp
AJ:1.atp,.J.e' • .D.! An!!!!' the Latin text is troa the Puma edition.)

r.

4:3
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able to act 1n that _,..

One of the tint things w. notioe about

living things 1s the d1fterenoe ot vital activIties to be found
In understanding this difference in aotivity, there

among them.

are two poe.fbl. poaltl.on.a:

either the d1fterenoes are simply

different and il'r.duolble, ,aneto another, or they are so reduciWe saw on the

ble.

V&r'1

til'St page ot this tbesis. that there

are numerous attempts not only to reduce all vital activities to
one, but to reduce both living and non-living to a connon denomi-

nator.

This. o:t course. is the first hope 01 the physical acl-

entist:

to explain allot the physical world 1n terms ot tbe

least numl.>er of concepts.
possible.

As long

Q

We have seen to What extent this 1s

only the material p:roeesses are considered,

there are great likenesses to be found among material living
th1nge in some of the1%' opex-ations.

As

t~

as the "aotivities"

ot eleot:rona are oonoem.ed, there ls even likeness between theae
•

non-living elements and liVing th1nga.

But how

ta%' tbis analysis

i8 still1n contact wtth reality 18 questionable.

Suoh an analy-

ais 1" concerned with bodies _. no' as a ifiml!! ot material things
but only as a

~at;

ot a whole,

e.8

st. !homas distinguishes in

R!.

Ente etE8sent1a.!
I'

I

. . . . . . ._.1

r

4·

•• n

Sst. '!bemas, De Enta, Ch III, 11. Poteat e:rgo hoc nam.en eo
pue rem quamdam <1eitgn.a.i::e. quae habet talem tOmant, ex qua sequitur in ipse. 'V'·sign.abl11tas tl"'1um d1mens1onum CtmlJ:N.$C181ane
(Italics mine , ut scilioet ex 111a forma null,'ii"': 'er!ue perfect!
sequatur, .& s1 a11quid a11ud superadd1tur, sit pMeter aign1f1catianem corporiS, sio dietl, at hoc modo corpus 8rit ~ter1al~s
et integral!. pal'S anbJalla: quia s10 anima _rib Meter tel uod
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A ph!lo8oph1cal anal.,.1. 1& concemed with the Whole in.

dividual, including the soul which make. tbe bod,. this 11vi:Y
bod,.. Such an anal,..1. agre.. with St. ifhou.. when he says I

POl' 1t 1s not of th1a alone that a thlng bas !nona••
and deoNa•• that 1t 11:v•• , but a thinS 18 sald to 11ve
alao because 1t ••na.. and und.~tand8 and 18 able to
pet-tom othe:r worics proper to 11t••;5
Per to .ense and to un4eHtand aX'$ i_nent aotivlties, and to'J.*
th1a Naaon aN the,. vital act1vit1•••
ID what _,., thel"efore, aN vegetation, sensation, local

mov. .nt, 1ntellectlon and appetition -i_nent activities",
what _,. do the,. give

&1'8

'WI

In

a metaphysical unde.. tand1ng of lit.,

1. V-etat1pp.. the aotlv1t1•• pJWOPe" to vegetative 11.te
growth. nutri tlcm. and MProduct1on." B1 g~owth 1. meant the

asaWlatlOl'l at mat... tor
in a1.. •

purpoe..

01' development and 1no:reue

!bid 18 not .. process of _ " add! tlon, l1ke brick upon

'Wiok, "thaI' the .... Wlated tood 1. conaiumeted
thinS 1t.elf into new pans

1st.

!h0Jld f l)1 II

aolo quod al,1qu1Cl &bet

.!!!

the "11v1ng

the 11virla thing It••lf 40;

!e......
..

!Z

leot. 1, 1819:

et

a.."....ntula

!he

I'on en1a ex hoe
'V1ftt, ••d . t l _

ex hoe quod ••11tlt et tnt. 1111t. at all. ope. . vitae exel'Ce:re
poteat.

4An• totl•• U. ~,'lSbll.14: There 18. however, .. dlt'tereM8 between nU'lr1.1IiI'tr and o0.n4uolvltJ to growth. In 80 fu
as the azli-.t;e th.S.ng 1f quan:tlltaUve. what 18 taken promote.
g:a-owthJ 1D 80 r.,.. .. 1t 1. a 4efWM 1ndlvldual, What 18 taken
nouriahea. Por the a»1mat. tbSns p"88ne8 ita substance O~ 8e.ent!al natUl'e and. es1ata as lons .a 1t 18 nour1ahCMh an4 it
cause. tho production, not of what 18 nounshed, but ot another
individual like l1h Ita e.sential nature al:t9adyenata, and
noth1ng generate. 1t88lJ', 1t only ma1nta1na 1t. eXiatence.
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ma.terial accumulation itself is called "growthtt; tho fact that by
this assimilation the individual substance is preserved, is
called "nutrition."

"Metabolismn is the general word which in-

cludes the processes of catabolism and anabolism:
restoration of energy and matter

~ ~

the loss and

pu£Pose of maintaining

the existence of the vegetable. Thirdly, living things reproduce
themael ves. 5 When the plant (or animal) has reached a certain
state of maturity, it brings new and distinct living individuals
into being.

A part of the living thing is separated fror.l the
parent(s) and becomes a new individual. 6 That this may be accomplished, however, the generative activities are first of all
directed to the perfection of the parents that they may be able
to reproduce their kind.

-

It is evident that physico-chemical processes are present in

Ssee George P. Xlubertanz, S.J., The P!lilosol'hX.2! Human
Nature, pp. 39-41 and all of Chapter I!'r.'
Gpor Ar:tstotle, this phenomenon was a clear indication of
the (more or less futile) striVing of corruptible things to share
in the divine. Ufe -- all kinds of li:£,o -- in some way participated divine activity. The continuation of the Stecies was the
closest corruptible things could come to divine e amIty. De
Anima, 4158.23-68: It .follows that first of' all we must tre'it of'
nutrItion and reproduction, for the nutritive soul is found along
with all the others and is the most primitive and widely distributed power ot: soul, being indeed that one in virtue of' which all
are said to have life. The acts in Which it manif'ests itself' are
reproduction and the use of' food -- reproduction, I say, for any
living thing that has reached its normal development and whioh is
not mutilated and whose mode ot generation is not spontaneous,
the most natural act is the production of another like itself, an
animal producing an anima,l, a plant a plant, in order that, as
far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and di-
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Em,. vegetative

activity.

But as Father Fablf'o points out, 7

It i8

not the presenef) at the.. forces that oharaetel'lz8a 1118. but the
peeuUar way In Which
activity.

'heo~gar.dsm U8e8
F

these torces in the vital

!hIs 18 the tOJ'Ce of ouz- jUdgment

dll1tlqu1sh the

M••'

of vital flOt:tvlt,. ~ the cnmdltions and

_m... !h1a 1a alao the force 0'1 Arutotle"
thfte

·or sepaMtlon: to
d1at1nc tim

or

(H,..ponenu in the nutl"1tlve aot1v1t,.: "that whioh 18 ne>u.r-

~.h.d (tb. enaoul&d bodiJ. that with 'Whloh it 18 nourished. [nutn.n~. and that Wh10h ~.he. It (!he aouJ.].·8
I.~tl...

!he f.t:lOm1.tlO paMlpl. or tontal obje.t

I I

vine. fhat u tbe seal t~ whioh aU tb.1nsa at!'! Vet, that tCU'
the . . . 0'1 which tm.l do whate.Yep the1Jt nature NndeN poseible.. b
phra...tOI- tbe .alee ot. _:loh J 1s aablgueua J ! t ma,.
_ _ 81iher fa) the . . to aohi_va wbtolle. (b) tbe being in
Whoa. interest. the
1. done. Smoe
no living 'hinS U
able to partake 1n What 18 .temal and d1v1ne by unlnteJ'I'Upted
cmt.ln1.taJwe (:to. notll1ns pel'1ahable can tOll8ver remain OM and
tNt . . . ). 1.. '.le. to achieve that end 1D the on!,. -7 PO_Sible
to It, and aweesa 18 poaalble tn -vying d..SMe. J 80 It
not 1nd. .d as the ••U __. . mcU,v14ual but oont1nu:•• Ita ea1atenc
1n aomethlng ,l1k~ 1ta.U .... not numerlcall,. but 8P8d11t:1call,. one \OJ

a.'

Ih.n

"_!lui

"'0. Fabre.,

~lla blolog1a" Bolletino
£'A. !ntattl eom1nc1a oon 11 x-!oonos-

ttlln Sagg10 de tl1oaotia

ftloaotl,OO, vOJ.,3, p. VOl

ceN om; 'lli ognl Ulllteatu10ne vitale de ordine lnterioN (vesetaUTo) v •• d1 fatto pruente un upetto t1.1c~hem1oo, polohi
11 vlvente non rlsulta d1 &It!'1 element! ., n~ 81 pub eostru1re •
oanae1"'f8.ft per altre torae ••••, La pecul1aJ'11Ji1 deUa vIta. •• " non
va .eNata neUe. pre.anaa d,t energ1. (ed ettett) d,'oJ'd1ne •• tNfisico, _ 21.e1 aodo <ltveno cU. O~" ohe 1. _4e81M .t~. pre-

sentano nei due' iiiOUd.t

rlfaJ

mo~g.nroo

itt organleo.

11 princlp10 1'1tale • qu1nd.1 benal .peo1f1eo .auperl0
all. rorH della t1s1co-ch:1mloa polehe Ie "gola e 1e domina, . .
ina1.- ha la sua att!v1t. lepta alla Dl8d•• 1me cemme a .sal

neeEt••ari .....

SArl.,otle,

R.! ,Aptma, 4l.e'beo-sa.
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anal,..1. 8learly shows that .ensation 18 a dlfterent

Bct!Yit" than thoae considered under -vegetation."

k~

ot

!'he object of

the activity 18 the pea.esslon by the one ••nalng of the material

torm of the one sensed .. 1flthout, how.Ter, aotuall,. tak1ng up and
asalnd.latlng the lat'ter'. physieal being.

fh,1. 1s to poese •• an-

other "l. . .t.rielly,a and 1t 1. really the de£1n1tlon

or

knowl-

edge. tith repld to 8enaatlon,. cona14es- th1II text tz-om. Ax-tatot.l., 9
P01' that whloh po:.oelves 1G'Q8t be an extended magnitude.
Senalt1 v1t1, however. 1s not an extended aagn1 tude, nor
le tbe sense. they are rather a certain oharaoter or
power o~ the Ol'pn. Front thl. 1.t 18 evIdent 1'lh7 excesses
in the ••nalhl. objects de.troy the ••nse-o~.... It
1s evident, again, why planta bave no .ensation. althoue;h
they have one pan o~ soul and are obvlou.ly afreoted by
tangible ob Jee., f01' thei%' tempel'atuH can be nl••d and
lowelNtd. l'he l'e&aon 1s that the,. have 1n them no mean.
no pnnc1ple oapable ot "cel vlng the tOl"lU ot aena1ble
objeota rithout 'helr mattep, but on thecontw1'7. when
the.,. are acted upon, the mat... :r acta upon them. aa well.
~"18

a)

a 41at1nct1on made between the one who ".nsel

(a material b.1ng) and tb$ s.n•• power tu:>pther w1th the act of
aensation l.elf (1mmaterial 1n 1ta mode at opel'8.tlon, slnee Its
act 1e pJleol••17 to pos•••• the

1ta

0Wl'l

tOB

f4 another without loa8 of

natUNl. rON). !he e.ue-p01f8:r, however,

organ, u

~c~

the

St. fb<su point. out,10 and ahaNe being with 1t.
tid.

it. ~, 4S4Bse-bs.
t'h01ll&8, ,~ n n. Am.M. leot.

iAn.totl.,

lOst.
24. ,666: :It 4101t quod
pJ.'f1mma .enaltlVUl1.,-rdeat' Pl'1iiiiii"'"Ol'gantmt. aensus eat 1n. quo eat potentia hujuamodl, quae 80111cet eat 8U8oeptlva apeele1U1:D alne ma-

teria.

Organum enim sensua, cum potentia Ipsa, utputa oculu8.
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!h18 la wb:1 e.... in the .enatble ob 3eot which de.tro,. the

organ, a.l.ao tmpai1"8 thI operation of the ••na. power.
Senaation d1t.tera trom ..... tation in tbat tw. one ••n-

b)

sing Noelv" the tom of the sensible object without tak1nS up

1_ phyeical exts'enoe, 1Ih11e the plant rece1ves the tOl'lll and

matt." both. !he "aaon tot! thls i. that the sense

p_~

18 not

an,. of ita objeo" (oontJnWiea) and so 18 abl. to Neelft the••

the plant 18 not .uGh .a _en, :11; 1. ent!rel,. mateltial both in being and opel"fLtion. I1m1ted to the pO.U'•• 81011
i!le .ena1ent
in

beins ,.

at ita own tom.

_'-rial 1n Ita e::ld.atenee, but immaterial

ita opefttion, In that 1t 18 able to poa••••

tOJtl'l8

other than

ita own.
:til either _;••

0)

o••d t,..
I

f

~

~

act1v1t1•• aN immanent .... t:b$7 pro-

one ...tins (plant

one aoting. For tb1a

peaBon

are

01"

an1mal) and the., pert.., the

th.,. vital act1vlt1•••

3) !22!1iltlon. !bU 18 pe,rbapa the plaM to lnvoduee ap....
pet! tlon,

as.no. t

all an1mal•• haft at le.a' one Sens8, tou.h, and. wheN
•••atlOll 1s tound, ~re 1s pleuure and pain. and that
.hiob. cause. pleU1.lft and pain, and. Where tbe.. aN,
theN aleo 18 d••1re, dealre bems appetite 1'011 wha'C 1.
t I

eat idem aubj..to, .ed .a.e a11ud est. quia ratione dltte" po-

tentia a corpon_ lotentia en:t.m. .at quasi lorma o%tgan1. ut aupra
tl'Adltum est. Bt 14eo subdlt quod 'magnitudo," id.at 01lganum
eorporeUII. ••t, 'quod ••UUlSl patltuJr.' ldeat quod .at 8u8ceptlV1.UZl
sensua, 810u' _t:eria t'omae. )Ton 1iamen eat eadem Rtl0 magnt ....
tudln1a et .en.altlV1 alva aensue, ••d 8en8U1 eat qua.dam Mtlo 1
ideat pJ;tcpcn:-t10 .t tor.uaa at potentla 1111\1a. 8el110.' _gnitudl-

nJ.a.
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pleasurable. ll
Appetite tollows upon knowledge; the good being presented, its
perfection known (either sensually or intellectually), it becomes
a posolble object or desire.

Again, desire (or aversion) is an

activity ot a living being which is initiated within it tor its
own. perfection.
4.

tntelli§ence.

The intellect is a power distinct fram

any we have so ta%'* conSidered, \'fith its own activity and its own
prope%'* object.

Its distinctive activity is manifested in a true

language; its proper object is being.

It is a form ot knowledge

whose activity is supra-material and supra-temporal (while sensation is both material and temporal) and whose object is grasped
without even the conditions of matter.

The evidence of the

supra-temporality of language is expressed by Father Klubertanz
in this way:12

Fo%'* example Ie to make e. s ta tement, and to arrange the
words properly to form a sentence, it is necessary to
have the whole meaning of the sentence in mind throughout each of its parts. Therefore, the act which generates language is a unifying, synthesizing aot, which
exists as a whole throughout an entire series of material activities.... The aot which dominates the successive must itself be without succession. The kind of 1.U1ity
that the sentenoe (or other complete expression of thOU&lt)
has as a meaningful sign involves a unifying act which is
extended neither in space nor in time. But that which Is
not extended in space or time is in no sense material.

161.

12G. P. Klubertanz, S. J ., ~ Phllos ophl

E! Human Nature _ p.
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-

Beoauae, theNtOR" the act of under.tancU.ns 18 in thla -7 w.ep_

an tedft trail (1.e., independent of) matter.. the power which px-o....

due.. that act u _11 as the nature .tJPam wbleh that power prooeeds muat be lI.epaJ'&ted.tI 1"1"<.'m mattel-.lI That 18 to eay, the intelle'ctl.... 80\11 1a lntl"1ns1caU., 1ndepcmdent of matter both 1n

It. oPC!t,..t:1on and 1n it. cud.atenee.
...p171tua.llt7·...

!hi. latter tact 18 called

there are other l1ncta ot ev1dence (tlUoh u

the

unl veHallt,. of1ntellectual knowledge) whioh lead to the . . .

oonolus1on an4 are tn"...tlpted el•••hare.

ot th1a thea1. 18

!'he pnnc1pal concem

b»plloat10l'lB eontained in the taot that

$be

heN 1s .. v1 tal (1~t;) act!vit,. that 18 lntr1naloal1,. mde-

pend_t of mat... A «.tuition o'E "11v1ns

th1ng'l •• -that

1tb1oh

IlJ7.tltheal.- matenala into 1ts CRIll 8ubatanoe" does not 1D.oluQ
tho 1U. ot tnte11M'.

it,. does 1nclude
5.

t:he

A 4et1n1tlon 111 hlW

1mraa~t

utiv.

lite of !.ntenect.

ltooomotlon. Qu1te 8impl,-. locomotion 18 caused by both

knowledp and ap~teDO" 'ogether with a

1natra:unent --l'8bJ' the 1fhole

ob3eot.

or

Consider b1."toUe

~1ng

QQ

paR of the bodyae the

18 :moved .oward the desired
this poln1a14
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"Nb,.

How motion 1JnpUes thJ!ee th1ng$, tint that which cause.
motion, secondly tha:t
it oawse. motion, and aga1n.
th1rdly,. tbat which 1s moved; and or theae,. that wb1ch
oausea motion 18 two-told, t1Nt17. that which 18 1 taelf
unmoved and, secondl.,. that .Moh both oauaee motion and
1. It8~lt moved. !be unmoved movent 1s tbe practical
good. [!.$ kn()WllltS]. that which 1. moved and causes motion
1. the appetetlve hoult7 (tw the animal wh1ch 18 moved
18 moved in so ta~aa 1t de.lr::!! and. desire 18 a apeoie.
ot mot1onor activit,.) and.:1 17. the t:b.1n8 moved 18
the WJ.1mal. BUt the instrument nth which deslM move&
1t, OllOe reached, 18 a part of the bod}'# hence 1t mwlt
be dealt with un.del" the tunctlc:m.s OOl'lmton to body end sOUl.

A.l.l the activitleawe

haV-Et

considered, th&n.ar& immanent

aotlv1ties. actlvitie. indicating a living being.

tbat these aetlvltle., While all
eaoh otbep and JlItildlea11,.

dl.t1"erent

te or

80.

EU'8 !,~t,

we

atill

have seen
dlfte~

a.mang

We have ••• that knowledge 1a a

activity than nutntlooJ and tu.Pther, under-

standing 1$ a dUt.re.nt

'b'D! ot activity than sensation..

(Appe'"

tit10n and locomotion ,are subsumed under sensltive and intelleet1ve lit••,)

aottvl'",

Becaus.

f t 1N1'fit

or

an 1l'Nduo1ble dUf'eren.. an tb.. level of
•

led to posIt an •••enUal dUh!'ellCe on the

level at c1aknoe ale

1)

the non-liv1n8 is essentiall,. difterent than the living,
d

j

16An8totle, P.I. . . 481&13: Both b . . . then, are tho.
eaWife. o~ loccaot'Iin,.
PJ,'lCe and appewne.,.... end 4SjA9 =
F. . aetl. otteJl,J!.ct contft:l"7 to ,knowl
.. e4ge 1n ,obediellOe \0 their
imaginings, lJ.t: ... l'egud ~g1nat1on as one spec!es of thinkin(] t wh11e 1n the othel'" an1mals theHis no prooc..,.& of th1nldng
or reuon1nS, but eole1,. imag!ne.t1011.,

l~ee abaPte%' rtro

of th1. tbeals ..
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2)

the sentiont is essentia.lly different than tho vegetn-

:3)

the intellective is essentially diff'erent tha.."'1 the sen-

tive;

tient.
And the last type includes an immateria.l existence which is
called "spiritual. 1f
THE GRADES OF MATERIAL LIFE.

In the proceeding section, we

considered living things in two ways:

in the first way, we dis-

tinguished five types of' immanent activity; in the second wa.y we
reduced these five to three grades of life.

The ratio of the

distinction is founded upon whether the object or the subject of'
the activity is considered. l ? The formal object analysis disclosed five types of' activities; but if we distinguish the mode
l7st • Thomas, ~est. Disp. de Veritate, X, 1 ad 2: 'Ad secundum d1cendum. qu genera potentlax-um animae distinguunt~
dupllclter: uno modo ex parte object!; all0 modo ex pa.rte subjectl, slve ex parte mod! agendl, quod in idem redit. 81 19itur
dlstlnguantur ex parte object!, sic lnvenluntur quinque potent!arum genera supra en'l..lll1.erata. 8i autem distinguantur ex parte
subjectl vel modi ngendi, slc sunt trIa genera potentiarum anImae; scilicet vegatativum, sansitivum, at intelleotivum. Operatio enim anunae tripllolter poteat se habere ad materIa!:.l. Uno
modo ita quod per modum naturalls actionis exerceatur; et tali~~
actionum prinoipium est potentia nutritiva, cujus actus exercentur qualltatlbus activis at passivis, siout at aliae actiones
m3,teriales. Alio modo ita quod operatio animae non pertingat ad
ipsam materiam. sed solum ad materine conditionas; stcut est in
actibus patentine sensitiva.e: in sensu onim recipitur species
sine lnateria, sed tamen cum mnteriae condi tlonibus. Tertio modo
ita. quod operatio aniraae excedat at rt'lD.teriam et LlB.tal"iae conditiones; at sic est pars a.nimae intellectiva.
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ot acttns. on

tho pal"t;

ot

the subject. there a:re three geMJ.'16

or

vital pOW$re. the vegetative, the sentient, and the lntel1eotlve4

round

The redon tOl' this distinction i8

to matter.

In the fir.t

twe

1n the aoults relation

of power, vegetative, the soul

ex-

e:rcls.s its natural mode of activity (as dlat1ngtdehed hall an

elioited or aequu.d mode) by _ana of acid." and pas.ive qualltles whoa. term 18 Pl'8cl••1y the material object as material.

thus, the plant take. 1n matter

'0 add to 1ta quantity_

Secondly

the opeN-tlon of' the .out _y tend not to the matter :1t ••11' ot an

objeot, but only to the- material oonditlona of
space and thte.

pant.ulant.,.

'Ih!a 18 the manner of O1Htntlon of the 8eD81tlve

power which SNape the fo_ at a material ob 3eot under the conditione of matter 'but without the phJ'81oal mat.1"1al existence
wb10h that object bU in reaU.t,..

The third Nlation wM.ch a

aoul oan have to _tt_ 18 to entirely . . . .d It and th. oondl•

tiona ot materiality,

g~ptng

the .tOl'm of an objeot apart hom.

1ta particularity, 8Pao&. and time.

proper to 1ntellect1vo activit,..

All . . have aeon this ls

o.ne

_Y. theretox-e, to dut1n-

gui8h the grades of Ute 18 by the: "lat1on

ot vital aotivity to.

matte:r.
A second -7 1s $Xpftea.d by John ot

st.

'fhomaa.

Sllw.e what

1acommon to all l1v1ng thing. 1. that the,. move themselves. he
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8&,..,18 there 1M a thNe-told distinotion at living thh'lp be ....
c,auae there aN thNe _,. 0'1 mov1n.g one••lf.,

Por, the prULclple

ot llOtlon

to dl1'ectlon and

aN

orientatIon

agent and end,

or

and with

l'8l1pecf;

tM motlcm. agent tdth "spect to the execution of

the motion (and alao the tom whtch 1. the proximate

p~olple

at

motIon as eld.at1ng 1n the agent and "pre8entat1". ot the end).
SCIlI8

living tb.S.r.\p move tbem8elvea ml7 with 88peot to the

ot the mot1 •• 8ince 1'oa fUld end are oompletely'.Mrm1ne4 t~ Vl_ bJ thai!' nature. 'lb.1. 1s the vegetabl. lUe.19
~outlC1l

othel' Uv1ng tIlSasa move tb. .elv•• both with respect to the

execution of mot1. ed w1th Mapeo' to aoqUlring fonna (in know-

lS,.

and t~. t

4.

I

.1'

af p. aeb 4C)
0JIb11r1'en\! .1 omnl - . C01lI1IUll6 e.t ••lp-

of 8t. IhCIIU.(h.'treua PJdlOSC2S-' Yol.

.... quod

aUll Blf)'ftN, at In hoe p~ di.'bs.nsuttur a non v!vente, quia non
vtvena tan. . .ovetw:- ab allo; v:1ventl auta lIO'Vet •• lP8um. Quare
d1ve"!taa v1tae u 41""1'80 modo .e IWNn41 4$bet deaum1. Bat
aute. t~l.x modUlI •• aovendl. ergo et tn.plex 1'1ta. Jt1ho:r probatu. j quia pl'1nolplum _twa 8.t agena .t tlni. f t1rda quid_
quoad 4lMotlonea .t alUo.ntla. agena Aut. . quoad _.cutlonem.
Baeutl0 auta c:lependet &b a11q'Wll t"fIIl'iIlIR taaqu.e.m a principali
Pflnoipl0 at ab1nat3Nlltn.o tamquam a mId!o operant!. S•• also
St. lb...... 1_ ~ •• I. 18, a o.
.

l~d •• AUqua .Pgo aunt, qua. IlOVent ••!pea .olum quoad exGout!· .. . .otua, nOl1 veM ad. aoqulNndum t1nem. vel t'ormam~. qu1bua

mo.aant •• t • •d ta.ta tWa quam .fox.. operandi 8\Ult lWa a.eterm1n.ata .. natu:N et pusl.. Wi. dantu.1"', non 88 movent ad 111&.
Et Me •• , int1mu.s padua v.1tu, llo111cet "ssetat1vua. Plantae

en1m movent •• q;uoad e.uoutlonem llutrttlanIa .\ _eratlon!... non
taman tinem alb! Pft•• t1~t, neque tGllV.&', qu1bu8 opeftmtWl",
aoqull"tln\.
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ledge) 'Which can be a source

ot motion. !his

1. sene. l1fe,20 1n

which the pr1nelple8 or operation are not; aU c1etem1ned by natuM, but aft -intentionallY" unit1ve ot the mover with the ob-

ject t4 lta _tion.
And 1n thAt t;h1rd place, there are those beings that move

themeel",•• even 1n •• tar .a tbey detel"J2d.ne the enda 01'
tivlt7. whtob are

n~

completel,. det.m1ned

tOl! them bY'

~:t1'

Datu".

Bot onlY' the erut 18 cho.en, but proportionate _ana also.
tntell•• t!ve belnpmeve the.elves ODInl _odo.il
j

1'0

a,.. up

80M o~ the th.1np

:tDntment &o'lV1t7 18 the sign

2,

The"

dlttennt

\'hue J

. ,...........

we have •••1'1:

1.

IlJ'II)

,

ac-

~

11te.

wa.,. in wh1ch activit,. ean be imman-

ent J thea. _yaa... pJ'eol••1y the dlat1hctlOl18 among types ot

SOrb14., AUa ve. . aunt, quae movent •• ip•• non solum quoad
e*,-utt&'m Ilotua, sed et1a quoad 1ps... torma., quae· pOS'sunt
ease pnnclplU1l motu 1_ quia non he.bent lIla. de1eJ'm1nat•• a natlU'at ••d. aoquiH" iuaa p._unt. Bt buiuslJlodl e.t nta sens!tlva. Benneen1m 110et .int poant1a. opeWit1v•• ; tameD. ma:t:senl t01U1. 1ntentlonallbU8 qulbua . , " _ tm.luntuJt potent:t1.,
a quib... taaquaa a Prin
.. olp!1• tOl'llBl1bua .t apeo1tlcat1v1aopeJlWtltlone. sua. 4e"nd.ntc. Ullde 1st. mo4ua .. movend1 &1t1w.at
quam moduli vitae .,.ge1;aUva.e, qu1a p1't1nolpta opeNnd1 non aunt
tota11". deMm1nata a natUl'& slout 1n . .getattv!., •• d ad. ea
poauJ'unt .e mo'feft, potent!.. en1m ••ult1ft. incUt1"erent•• I'Unt
ad. bas vel1ll.u speoi•• e.u 01:>3"-.

2!m4., All.. den1que ....nt .etp•• et1am quoad aeterminatIon. . r· , qul. non habent a natul'a totaU tel' determinatum f1nem,
.ed lUwn aib1 P2lU.,ttuunt. at 1ta non &guntup in oOSlloacendo
tlnem,
e". asunt 14eeque 1l'1d18ent ratione com-aNn_ proportlauea ftn18 cum _41ia, at ale movent .. OJInl modo, quo ali qui d.
8e movere poteat, sCU1cet. quoad t1neta at quoad tor.maa opeftndi
et quoad eucution_ motu••

.,.<1
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llv1ngth1nga.
the dlfterent t,pes of' l1:te have a common "terent in

3.
:matter,
I

011

the one hand, to whlcb tbe.y have dl£terent relational

and the,. have a 00_011 reterent .in

the,.

pp1nc1pl.~

9! !otlop., to wh1.h

have dlZteftnt J'$lations.

4. !be.e %'elations auggeat not anI:,. a dlt'terence among the·
t)'Pes of l.tvlng thinS'. but a

1s aup• .-lor to another.
grade

o~

S!9~

difference 1n which one t,p.

fJ!he buis tor 8uperiol'lt,. 1n a certain

lite. St. fb(QU IlIa18, is tauna in the d.greeof luaan-

enoe in the be1ng t e aet1v1t7. fo the utent that the aotlvlt:r
produced by a be111g hae ita

oris!!

.m and

wrm1nate~

within that

be1ns •. to that extent 14 that being hlgher than and aupel'1or to
anotheSt whoae actInt,. i. not so immanent.

The ..ord St. Thoma.

_y...

tn" 18 &~t1Jlm.1a. 8J7om the higher
na~a, ~ prooee4 1%1 a m.ore 1nt1mate
~ cevera•

118••

to ex;p.rea .. tbJ.a

.~

•

n n fit

21st.

fhomaa .Con~ 9!B~.:I IV

,0.

11 t

Pl"1nclpium autam

hu1ua intent!oni. liIiie 1U'Si. opoptet, quod, aeoundum dlVfUMs1tatem na't;ua.rum, dlV8J!'8W1 • •nat1on1. ~ mvenituP in "bus; at
quanto allqua natuN. .at &It:1OPl tanto 14 quod ex ea amanat magi.
eat In'S... In "'bull ena CIIIl bUll 1nan1JlVita oo,ppoPa in:t1JmmJ. 10C'W'Il tenet, In qu1bu.e uanatlone:$ ali.p .e.e non poasunt n1.1 1n
aotionem tmtus eol'UJl. in aliquod alteJ'Um, 810 en1m ex 19ne
tuP ign1a. dma ab 19ne corpua extN.Jl8\8l al.taMtur at ad qual1tatela at .peal. . 19a.1a pJ'odl.l.eltur. Poe' 1Dan1ma_ veJtO eorpwa.
p~ 100_ tenant plantae. In qu1bUl jam emnatl0 ex !ntePion
procedlt f .inquantura "11106t ht.tr4oP plantae 1ntmneua in 8._n con
veJ'titl.ut .t 111ud
1;$%'1'&. mandatum creaclt 111 plantam. Jam
ergo h10 primwl ga4ua vitae lnYenlturJ Dam vivent1a aunt quae
aeipsa movent ad agendum. 1l1a vero quae non nUl ••'enora movere
posaunt OIIlino aunt vIta oarent1aJ in planti. vel'O hoc indicium
vitae eat quod 14 q,uod. in ips1• •at movet a11quaa formam. Bat
tamen 111t& plantarum 1aperfeeta" quia, emanatl0 1n .ia lice' ab

sene"'-

._men

"
il
ii
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ot th1a '.".n1; ftpNaent. the .! RCNlter10d _,. wh1ch ••
adopted to anal,-.e 11V1ns th1ns81
~

ha....

those natures whose activitie.

more lntlma:be aft higher natu"_.

m.

DlO"

tbe proper aetivlty of a nature begins and temin-

ate. Within that IlAt\U'8. tbe more -intimat.d 1t 18 J and the 1.8.

It neede of what 1••xte1'1o~ to 1t, the higher 1s that nature and
the

mo1'e

pel*tect 1e It. l.Ue.

Far !nan1mate th1nga, theN ts no

poa.lbl. ema1l&tlan . .ept by the ..t1on or OM upon another.
!hi. la, ti"' of all, motion 1n tbe at,,1e' sens••••condl7. the

are ftri.oua ehem1eal aotlona atJ4 the "natural motiona" ot atomic
,

pari1el...

In the. . -actlona.- however, one obJect (or paR)

mOTe8 another ex"l'tmeoua to 1t.

But "11v1ng tbJ.rlgl aN tboae

iI'

1nterioJ'1 prO(UJdat. tamen pw1at1m ab 1nttu·lonbua axten. quod
emanat t1n&llt•• 08l1no enr1nsecum 1nv.n1turJ humor Rim Ubori8
pJ'lmo ab arbon epe41ems tit fl_ at tan4em huotua ab 8.1"'boris

corti" disc:retul, 8~ el ooUlp1iU8, pertNte aut_ b-uctu.
'
omn1noab Q"bC" ••para.... at I 111 teft'Ul cadena, .em.ent1na rt~
tut. productt allam. p1antaa. 81 qu1a .tlam dll1pnte1' ocma1de~
ot, p~ bu1ua ~tlcm1. princ1plU1l ab ut;erlwl sum1tvJ nanJ
bUlla. 1n~.•cu.a autbona peSt mdin.. a tens. eum1 t~ de qua
plGtalUc1plt nut~... Ulv.. plantarum v••• vit_, a1t101'

gftdua

nil.. In:,en1tur, quae est

eecUXldua an1• • aena1t1vam,

cu1ua .-:natl0 propria.tal at> .x.terio~ ino!plat. in 1n_u,lIj.ul
te!l"lld.natuP, at, quanto .....t1. _as. !no...eft t ,tanto magi. a4
tntt. " .....ntt., ••nelb1le _1m exwri. tcm.m 8U1U11. eXMrio:ribus ••nalbu8 lnger1t. a quibu8 Pl'ooecU.t 111 'mag1natlonem et ult.rl\U1 1n .morlae 1ihe.au...... In quollbet t..." bu1ua emanation18 Pl"oc...u pr1nelplum. .t termlnua pertinent ad divena, non en1m
allqua potentla . . .i'1va in ••1pe_ retl.etltur. .., ergo hie
grad,. vitae tanto alt10r qua vlta plantal"Ul11 quanta opeNtl0
huins vitae -S18 in lut1m1s cont1netul', non taMn .at CImlino
vita peP1"ecta, C'Wll emanatio tit '~1' ex uno in alterum. Est
1s1tnlJ' eupreDlWl .t ptlrtectus 884\18 'Vitae, qu1 e8t .ecundUDl Intellectum. nul 1nteU"tua 1n ••1pSlml re1"lectltur, et ••1patml
int.lUger. poteat.
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wh1ch move the.elve. t-o act."

And th1s moving

ot oneself 1s

.found in 1ts loweat tOl'm 1n plants.

Fw, in planta,
...d

*len. with

other plant.
cause of

&

fA

certain ttlntl'wlc humou:rft 18 convertftd to

tbe aetlan of the 8011, 18 eonve:pted Into

an-

fbi. presence 1n a plant of a principle that 1s the

Port the cause ot to:rm can

tcmat 18 a aign of lite.

be onl7 anothertoftl.- Whioh, belDS an lntJl'!nel0 principle of

action, aets through the whole being to pJtOduce what eventuall,.
Is auotlwz- ot the same speci•• with the sa. power
tlon.

In the plant,

howeve~,

tC'll!, although tlW emenatlan

p~ed.

tl'Ola wIthin, ,...t little 0"

.As a matter of

rut,

pl. of tb1a veptatlw emanation Is

plant. . tor 11;

:reproduc-

theN 18 0'ft17 an !nwerfeet I1fe.

c~1etel,.

11tt1. 1t 1s exteplol"l••d until at 1.. , 1t U
than 1-' p,.wl.ple •

or

eftl1

8C1Jl111th!ng

othel'

the tt••t pr1nol-

extrinsio to tbe

I'M.!"". 1 . nQ11lJlahilent tPCm the 8011, and.

through

lMUlJ' prooe.8ea tbat n8tlP1aluDent 1s convened into sari.
But the" 1s a hlghel' .torm

ot lite: tbat

of the .ensitive

soul wh10h 18 fotmd in an1mela. Although ita pPOper emanation
proceed. boa without, £w ,he .e1180 I*$oel ve. the impression of

extemAl objects, 1&t 1t. teN1nates with1n.
C011l8S

i'h18 activity be-

moM and more lntrb:la10 (more and more 1nt1mate) u

emanat10n proceeds hOUl the .xtemal
and even to the sense LJell.Ol"1_

GEmS• •

the

to thfl 1mag1natlon

Even in th1a emanation,

h01l'8V81',

there i8 a dltferenee of sub Jeot with 1'espeot t:o the beginning
and the end of the aotivity. Por, u St. !hQIIU points out. "ne

aeneitive paws%' reflecta upon itself."
grade

ot lUe 18 h1gbe:a-

Therefore, While this

than plant lUe, at111 it 18 also imper-

teet. beoaUiG the p,,1:nciple ot the vlta.l act1v1t7 18 other than
the tem_

It 1s the powz-

~

.eU-..tleot1on, lmowledge ot

..

~

••If. that 1nd1eate. the pa:rteotlon ot l1re, and th1s perfection

18 bad in llh- -aocol"41ng to intellect .. It

St_ !'h.alIIi."#, howe'Mr» polDta out that there aft 488ft.. ot

1nteUeotual llte.g

lbe 1. . . . 1. tbe hwIan, tor, although man

18 able to Ntleet upaa. himself, at111 the fl:rat

knowledgft

00lle8

tl'QlD; without.

panda upon pbarltuma.

am fa

Sourc8

ot his

lntelleotual. knowledge de-

'Ih18 1s no't ... inVinal0 depttndeneeJ but,

o. . .quent to the bod,...ou1 unit that man b,a11 knowledge in
80ae

-7 hu 1ta _lain in sene. and Ie theftt. .

And to "peat

0110. mON,

!.!a Q!FJl!!eco.

becaus. the aotual operation

~ 'I..lnde~

at.nd1118 lu.U 1a not· upend.ent upon the material organa of
•

•

1
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powe~ o~ a subsistent soul.24
the knowledge which an

~l

no beginning t:rom. things outs1de
tirel,. intr1naio.

to be.

baa t St. fbomas continues J need
~

him; to that extent 1t 1s en..

But to unde%tatand. in an angel, i.other than

fh1B 41ft"1.,." theref'Ol"'$, pNvents the angel from. poa.

aessing the full

pe~ectlon

of life.

0l'll7 in GOd, then, in Whom to understand 18 the same a8 to
be, 18 eOD\Plete '1JIIt8Jl(tnce, cOlJiJPlete 1nt.1macy of activity :round,

and theretore, in GOt.'l theNt is the perfectIon

ot 11te.

:lotto. that It 18 1lIportant to realtM the bu1a tor validl,.
p1'ed1_t~ Ute ~ 4'l1Pla and ot God. In the 8econd ohapter, we
a.paNted lite !rca an7 mate1'1al Um1 tattoo; in this chapter . .

have seen to .. greater extent how the activities
•

or

lite are pJl'Op

I

$KSt. !.b.omaa axpla1ns the dUt'el"ent _,.. in 'Whicb the senee
and 1I1.11eot uae bod1.. in thetr act or knowing in I PI ' - .
leot. 8,. 119.eo. )Jam 1n_111p" quod&l:!l'l'lledo .et ppop~~ ,
quoda'llaOdo •• t OGttJ'uftotl. Se1endwa •• t 19i'hl". quod al1qua op$ratic ani._ aut paaal0 ••t quae 1nd.lget o.,,01'e aleut Ins~n

..t

to .t alout objeoto.11ou! vide" 1nd1get corpo:re, slout objeoto, quia oolor, qui ea' objeotum Yiaus.
in CQllPOl'th Item
aiou' lDatl'WD8nto, qu1a "t'1Il0, etat altab an1ma. non. est taman
nial 118"'- organ_ vla_. 8OWoet pupilla, quae est u' 1nat~
tum, .t .10 Y1dere non eat an1.se tantum, .ed .at o:rganl. Altqua
aUMm .1'&t10 .at, quae 1nd1pt oOl'POre, non tamen ateut lnstwmento, aed aiout objecto
Hoe modo phantasmata s. habent ad. inteUectua.
0010"' ad Y1aum...... mx heo duo ....
quun~.
U'n.u1a eat, quod 1ntelllaeN .st pJ-OPria OJ)eJPat10 an1me.e,
et non 1n4iget COJlpOM nisi ut 00 ". . to 'bantum, u1; dlotrua .at.,
vldere auha .t all.eoperetlone• •t pae.lon•• non aunt anima.
tantum, sed oonittnOtl. Aliud eat, quod habet operat1enem pep.•• ,
habet .t1a .Ne et subslatontl_ per 841' at tllu4, quod non habet open.1;1onem pel' 8C1f non habet •••• P." se.Bt Ideo bttel1e.tus est tozw.8ubelstens, alia. pot.nt1ae aunt torma. in mater1a.

.1eu'tantum....

62

erly and essentially oalled "1nlm8nent" and are not to be limited
to vegetative activities.

Therefore, siven the existence of

angels and of God, if their activity is intellectual, as it must

--

be, then they are said to live and to live in a much more perfect
way than any material l1ving thing.
SELIcil_PERFECTION OR ttASEITAS. n

The various modes 01' life,

therefore, are graded according as the source and term. of aotivity are intimate to the living thing.

perfect state of such
intimacy is called "aseitas" by M. Tornatore. 25 This is probably
~le

best rendered in English as tfselt-perfection. It

To move oneself,

then, in the wide use of the term motion, belongs to living
things; and the more perfectly a thing moves itself as rar as the
possession of principle and term of motion, the more perfect its
1ife. 26 For any activity there are three "parts n : the principles of the activity, the
activity.

~~e

activit~

itself, and the term or the

proportionate perfection of immanent activity con-

25J • B. Tornatore, tiDe Vita eiusque Gradibus,tt Divus Thomas
(Piacenza) vol. 1, p. 93: Hmo jam videre est, qua ratIone vIta
vel in primo sui ac 1.Uli va rsali ori oonceptu importet quamda!ll aseitatem, in 1psaque consiatnt; quod at sparta exprimunt ipsaa dietionas: ex. se L10tUl1l habere; agere se i secundum quod operantur ex
se ipsis. Quum vero sseitas sit perfectionum maxima. consequltur
vitam esse ultimam viventis perrectionem, fastigium ao veluti
caput,
OuillS conservations facile omnia dabit. Vita a.utem eo
erit per eaffor in vlvente, quo perTectlor aseltas.

;PrO

28st. Thomas, S. Th., I, 18, 3 c: Ad euius ev1dentiam censid
erandum est quod cum nvera dicantur aliqua secundum quod operantur ex seipsis, at non quasi ab aliis mota; quanto perfectius
competlt hoe alieui, ta.nto perfectlus in eo invenitur vita.
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alata in juat th1s 1

to what extent are the•• parts identified'

fhat What we caU "11£.- consists 1n some kind of autonomous ao-

tivity. no one will

den,._

!bat there can be no mo" autonomous

actlv1t,. tban wben principles of aotlv1t7, aotlvlt,. itaelf, and

teN of aotiv1t7 al'e lrltr1nBic to the open'ing 8ubjeot ls likew18e evident. A U'i'tle "flectIon wUl autt10e to show tbat th1a

1, t1"Ue

anl,. 1n an 1ftteUeet know1ns

1t.81t when suoh tnt.ne.-

tion 18 identical with the YeJl7 be1l1g of the knower.

pnved that

that Be 1s

God

n-

BaV'1llg

exlata and 1s lntelUpnt, 1t toUowaneoe.ear117

own \U1defttanding Of HtIIselr.S7 Ue 1s the knower,.

ill no -7 dependent upon arqth1ng out.lde B1lueU t . the

80Ul'0e

o'E Hi. knowledge (foil no$b1ng but Riuel" 18 the adequate ob j80t
ot' .lt1s knowlodge), and. the term ot H18 knowledge, Hl. Idea of H

••It ... ob3••' w11:h ftlat1an to !I_elf ... knower, 18 noth.1ng but

Bis 41vSne ••••no. it.elf .. 1dentlty it.elf., but oalled knower
•

and kn01lll beoau.. of' cu.r poor 'Wldewtandlng of the activit,. o£

In thls a,. 18 tbe aetInt,.. of God .os1; !m.manent. moet in-

God.
r

ft,

UJ
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tlmate, most truJ:y.lih.

Other be1ngsal"'$ sald to live in so tar

as they apprcx1mate this intimacl of kn01lfl.nf3
.An angel29 knows himselt dlNOt17J

selt 1s not b1s very essence.
the

~l'.

,..t

op.el.J~lf<IJ

his !mo"ledge

i!lel'e 1s a .kind

or

him-

ot compos 1 tion in

natuN, the:re 1s a composltion (bealdes 8aeenee and···

existence) of .alene. and act ~ knowle4ge,29 a oomposition ana..;.

logoua to the o amp oei tlon of material beIngs.
a pePt'$ct 1lltIaterlal. being such as·G04 is.

For an angel 18 n

Although the angel'.

c0lJtP081tlon 1. 1n the Umater1al order, at111 1t 18 a composItion

a ltp&l'b-to-parttt anal.ogoua to matter'. ftpart-outs1de-ot-pal"ti."
Sueh a o01.'q)oalt1onputa the angel 'e power tor intimate 1lmtanent

ao"ivit,.
1s.

~l_

that 0'1 the purel., simple lnaaterlallty that

God

JIan, or hS.e aaWN pal'tly EteJl'lal, 18 dependent upon that

matter (in hi. pft8ent _tate) toe the beg1mdng oE h:la intel.leot1on.

POI' although, .. 1I1teUeot, he too can know h1msel.t. such

·.t.

•

thoaa.a f Qcc'" Gentes, III !_. 91sAdhuo, na~ 8upel'l

in .\10 1Dt1mo oEtiliiit1 naEiem lnr.no"m1n .jus supremo.
lfattiJ'a au",- Sntel1..tullla ••, auper107 oorpOMlt, cont1ng1t autem e. . secunda illquem pa.rbemau1 quae eat anima ·1ntellectlva.

or

QI.'JOJ't.,

ts11N1'

quod, 8icut oorpus pertectum per an1.J.llam tntell.eo-

~tea,

n.

97.·

tiva 8St aupNl'tl'UJlt 111 gene" oorp02'UJ1, ita anima lntellective. qua
unltlu- COl'PO'ri 81t 1nt1-. 1n genere substantlarum 1ntelleotuallum
Sunt 18ltuzt al.1quae substantiae 1ntellao'trualea non unit•• carpor!
bus, auperlo~.8ecundUII natU8e Ol!'Uinem 1IUt.1ltta. Se. also Oontra
c~

29st• fhamas,S.fb.., I, N, 3 0; Actue ad quem c~tur
potentia ope:ratlva-;
opei-atl0. In an.gelo autem non est idem
1ntel11gew ot e •• 8 J nee a11qua a11a operatio aut in ipso, aut in
quooumque al10 cl'eato, est Idem quod ejus esse. unde assentia an
gell non est. 'us potentia :tntel1ec tiva.1 nee al10ujua cl'9atl easent1a eat eius operatlva potentia.

en
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selt-knowledge i8 poasible only att.,. his intellect has been
actuated b7 a spec1•• frOlll the matter ot his senses.

'fhua .. his

knowing 18 les8 intimate. les. immanent, 1.8. of I1te than that

of an angel or of'

God
8ena1t1ve anS.mallqr has no powr of' seU-Mf'leet1on owing to

1ta cQtJ.\Plete 1lmle1'81on 1n matter w1thout a subs1sting immaterial

toa that 18 able to l!'8tlect upon iuelt of itself (even though.
as 1n the oa•• ot man, 1t may need the _,tel'" of its ref'leot1QU
~

without) til

It baa an analogous •• If-arnowledge,

1n that 1t

knowe. sena1hl,-, what 18 good far 1t ( ••l1'-p1"'otectlcm, food) and

can reproduce 1ta sPMles..

!he plant bu no

Pl~le4e

whatsoever

but 1ta .ot1v1t7 18 aleo dil"&cted 1;. 1ta OlIn inCJI84a8 and aelt-

prod:u.etlon.

fl»l'Gtow_ 1t baa a care t_ it••U whlch fall . .

upon aoz.ae Ion

~

Imowledge, alba!t, not 1_ own.

In th1I -7 1M h . to a ••rtam extent how all th.1np aha"
•

in the peJ'1'e.t existence of God.

!heir sharing, ot cGUNe" Is 1n

a sreatl,- 1ap$l"t'eot ...." but attU thea.eltas
t p

18 "fleeted 1n plant lU8 and even in the

p~per

d~o

to God. al

e:dstenoe of

non-i!Y1ns th.blge.
SlJDA.Rr.

'lhua tar our inve.tigation ot 11v1ng thing, hU

concluded to J
1.
1~.

o.PeJltlt1onall,., lite U the capacity

t~

1aanent actlv-

What th18 impUes w11l. be taken up in the last chaptex-.

2.

It. ph1losophic«1 ana1,..1a of material I1fe 1n terms of

6e
causes "s.paratedft t'x-<ml conditions" leads us to conclude to

It

de-

tin1 tlon that transcends material 111'e.,

t'hus,

3.

"lU.-

1a ,more extensive than "soul" J tor sepa-

rated substance. and God m.mself, 'becaus. the,. have immanent activities, are aaid to l1.ve, but without a "principle of life,· a
Boul.30

the pe3!'teetlQD

4.

or

11t•• being the pe:r.-feot immanence of

actlv1t'11n which pnnciple, activity, and tex-m are identical ... 18
found in God.
u

Othe,. th1ngs 11ve with a 11te more

OP

less

pe~eet

their activIty approaehes or reo.d•• trom the pertect10n of'

the activity of God.

In chapter tour. _

5.

wUl draw out the impl1cations of

the principles and conolusions we have estabUshed in these f1l'St
three

cb.apte~,

espeoially with regard to relatIng our operation-

-

al def1nition or 11re to St. Thomas l dictum that v1vere est esae
,

v1vent1bus.
I

1'0 conclude:

Jlhat 1ntu1t1on, What wight has this anaJ.ysls

ot 11fe given ua? rha !Might is three-told:
lOst. !ho. . , S.p., I, 18, 3 ad 2aAd $ootUld1.ua d1oendum,
stout DeUIJ es1 ipswa .\lura $S'''~ et auum mte1l1geJle, 1 t& et

quod

anum Ylve".. Bt pJropte,. hOG 810 Tivit, quod non habet Y1vendl
p;r1nclpS:ua. S•• alao ibid., ad 3: Ad _"tum dleendua, quod
vita in letta lnfer1Ol!"t13ua ",1pitur 1n nat\tft oolt'Upt1bl11, quae
1ndlset at gene rat lane ad cOI18el"Vatlonem speelei, of; al1mento ad
canaenatlon8'm lndlvldul. lit pl'Opter hoc in iat18 Interionbus
non lnvenitur vIta sine anima veget.1bl11. Sed hoc non habet locum in :rebua 1ntlonuptibl11bus.
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1.
only is

There are
the~

~rad.es

Ute.

w dames among living things; not

but there are ldnds of 11f'e, differing as

more and lesa perfect.
S.

intimacy
3.

!he measure of the perr.,etlan of 11te 1s found in the
,0%"

selt-p08s.ss1on of the vit..l activity.

fida 41ttex-enee 1n the degl'ee ot pel'i'"ectlon lndicates

the analogows natu&

in the next ohap"r.

or

lite .. whioh Will be discussed at length

CHAPTER IV
~ Detinition~

Motion, operation, Substantiality

That being is said to have life which throu@k and of itself has nourislwwnt, increase, and decrease. It must
be understood, however, that this explanation is more by
way of example than by way of definition. For, it is
not of this alone that a thing has increase and decrease
that it lives, but a thins is said to live also because
it senses and understands and is able to perfor.m other
Vlorlcs proper to life. From this consideration we see
tilat there is lite in the separated substances for this
reason, that they have intellect and will (as is clear
in the eleventh book of the Iileta*hysicS), although there
is no growth or nourishment in ~ em. But because in
these generable and corruptible things, the vegetati va
soul to which nourishment and growth pertain (as was
said at the end ot the first book) is the prinCiple ot
life, here there is given by way of example of that
"having life," that which has nourish.."'"OOnt and growth.
The proper ratio of li£e, however, is from this that a
thing is of sueE a nature as to move itself, taking motion in the wide sense, in so f'ar as the intelleotual
operation 1s called some kind of motion. For, we say
that a be1ng is without lii'o whioh oan be moved only by
"
an exterior souree. l
This text serves both as a sumt.'t\Sry of what we have seen and
as an introduotion to what tollows.

It emphasizes the "separated"

1st. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 1, fi.~19: Illud autem dic1tur habere vltam-;-quod" per selpsam habet allmentum, augmentum
et decrementum. Sciendum autem. est, quod hoc explanatio magis
est per modum exempli, quam per modum de1"initionls. Non enim ex.
hoc solo quod aliquid habet Qugmentum et decrementum vlvit, sed
et1am ex hoc quod sentit at intelligit, et alia opera vitae exarcere poteat. unde in substantlis separatis est vita ex hoc quod
habont intelleotum et voluntatem, ut patet in undecimo 14etap~1~, 11cet non s1 t in eis augmentum et alimentum.
Sed qilla
.
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character of life, its non-dependence, of itself, upon material
conditions; and also it re-lntroduces tlmotiontt which we will now
study under another aspect:
rJOTION VS. Oi'EHATI01J.

its relation to operation.
St. Thomas often uses terms in very

analogous ways; it is practically impossible to determine one precise meaning f'or a term.
tion. tt

This is especially the case Vii th

ftl::lO '"

It has been said :many times that a living thing is that

which is able to "move itself."
chapter, this phrase

~1ay

As we pointed out in the second

have two meanings:

one, signif'ying the

transient action of one part of a living thing upon another part
of itself'; the ather signifying an operation itself.

We will now

investigate this second use of "move oneself't by doing two things:

1)

by adequately distinguishing motion in the strict sensefram

operation; and 2) by determining why operation is widely or even
improperly said to be self-motion.
First of all, st. Thomas points out that a thing is said to
be living when one of the two types of motion is found in it:
that motion whereby one paX't moves another part, or that :motion

lstis generabilibus et corruptibilibus anima, quae est in plantis,
ad quam pertinent allmentum at augmentum, ut in fine primi dictum
est, princ1pium est vitae, ideo hic quasi GXGm.plarlter exposult
Mbabens vi tam, ff id quod habet alimentum et au.gm.entum. propria
autem ratio vitae est ex hoc -, quod aliquid est natum movere seipsum, large accipiendo maturo, prout etiam intellectualis operatio
motus qu1dam dioitur. En enim sine vita osse dlcimus, quae ab
exterior! tantum principia moveri possunt.
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or operation that is itself as end. 2 With regard to the first

-

type. this motion may be considered as racei ved and in this respect is motion in the strict sense, the act of that which is in
This type ot motion is
called actus imperfect.i; such motion is successive and in time. 3

potency and in so far as it is in potenoy.

Correlative to this uperfection" (actus)
.. which belongs to that
which exists in potenoy, is that motion whioh is produoed by that
whioh is actual. 4 This latter is transient aotion. As we saw
before. although this action proceeds :from. a being whioh is in
aot, it is the perfection of another and so is identified with the
2st • Thomas, s. ~., I, 18, 1 e: Ex quo patet quod 111a pro
prie aunt viventla7 quae seipaa seoundum aliquam speclem motus movent; sive accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dlcltur actus imperfecti, Id est existentis in potentia; sive motus acciplatur
comnnmiter, prout motua dicitur etiam actus perfecti; prout intelligere at sentlre dieuntur moveri, ut dicitur (De Anima); ut sie
viventia dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum,-Vel operationem
ali quam. Ea voro in quorum natura non est ut se agant ad aliquem
motum vel operationem, viventla dici non possunt, nisi per aliq
slm1Iitudlnem.
3s t. Thomas, s. Th., I"'II, 31, 2 ad 1: Motus duplic1te:ro
dicitur; uno modo,-qmest actus imperfectl, scilicet existentls
in potentia, inquantum huiusmodiJ at taIls motus est successlvus
at in tempore. See als 0 In IV Sent. d. 17, 5, :5 ad l: Ad pri.mum
ergo dleendum, quod motusauplirni'r dicitur, ut patet in 3 De
Anima (text. com. 28). Est enim quidarn motus qui est actus !iiiperTectl, qui est exitus de potentia in actum; et talis oportet
quod sit succeasivus, quia semper expectat aliquid in futurum ad
perfectianem suae speciel, eo quod pars motuB est alterius speciei
a toto motu. ut dicitur in 10 Eth. (cap. 2 vel 4) ••••

I, 53, 1 ad 2:

4st • Thomas, s. ~n.,
Ad secundum dicendum,
quod l'llotus exlstentis-Yn potentia est actus imperfectl. Sed motus
qui est secundum app1icatlonem virtutis, est existentis in actu,
quia virtus rei est secundum quod actus est.
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first type of motion; their distinction is one of source and recipient.

In oontrast to these two "motions" 1s that "motion"

which is a perfection of the one acting, not, however, in so far
as the one acting is potential in same way; but precisely as the

one aoting is in act. is he perfected by this type of motion.
This motion is the

actt~

self is not in time.

perfect!; !t is non-successive and

~

!i

Such are the activities ot sensing and

understanding.5
The difference, then, betilsen the act of' that which is impel'

fect and the act of that which is perfect, is that the first is
not the perfection of the agent, but of that which is moved ..
Thus. the act of the perfect is called "motion" only through a
likeness with strict motion, in so far as both are "perfections,"
the one of' that Which exists in potency, the other ot that which
"

Sst. Thoma.s$ In IV Sent., 17, 5, 3 ad 1: Alius motus est
actus ;e2rfectl, q'l..ir"magis operatio dl.citur, qu1 non expeetat 0.11qUId in l'uturum ad eomplementum suae speciei, sieut sentire; at
talis motus non est successivus, sed subltus; et s1 contingat quod
talls motus sit in tempore, hoc orit per accidens, quia mensuratur
in quolibet instanti illius temporis in quo dicitur ess& ••••
Thus. that which is no way is tendin£} to peri'ection, but is ultimate perfection, is entirely w!£hou£ motion; this is (lod.-In II
Sent. j 11, 2, 1 0: Respondeo dieendum quod secundum Philos'ophum,
"OPe"ratio at motus di,fferunt: operatio enm est actus perfect!,
ut lucid! lucero. et intellectus in actu, intelligere; sed motus
est actus imperfect! tendentis in perfectionem; et ideo id quod
est in sua ultima perfections, habet operationem sine motu, sicut
Deus J quod autem dlstat ab ultima perfections, habet operatianem
canjunctam motui ••••

"'/2

exists in act. 6

Since, however, the .form of a thing is the prin-

ciple of its actions, al"l.d it is by the torm that the thing is in
act and acts, when we say that immanent aotion is the act oi' the
perfect, this is not to be understood only in a causal sense.
Such an u..'I'1derstandlng would merely show how it dl1'fers from motion in the strict senSe.

This understanding, however, does not

show its distinction trom transient action; for all actions pro-

ceed from a being in act and in so far as it 18 in act. 7

Rather,

nact of the perfect" must also be understood formally} that is,
not only is it an aot ot a pl"inciple that has been perfected, but

it Is, eVen more, a perfection in the formal sense ot that agent
itself in the very respect in which that agent is in act. 8

It is

Sst. Thomas, s. Th., I, 18, :5 ad 1: \:~uarum haee est dif'ferentia, quia prima actTO non est perfectl0 agentls, quod movst,.
sed ipsius motl; secunda autem actio, est peri"ectio agentis.
tJnde, quia motus est aotus mobilis, secunda actiO, in quantum. est
actus oporantls, die1tur motll.s eius ex hac similltudlne, quod,
siout motus est actus mobilis, ita hujusmodi a.ctio est notus
agentis; lieet motus sit actus imperfect! scilicet existentis in
potentla, hujusmodi autem actio sit actus perfect!, id eat, axistentis in actu.
7St • Thomas, Quneet. DiSi- de Veritate, 8, 6 c: Hae autem
duae a.ctiones in hoc conven unt quoo utraque non progreditur nisi
ab existente in actu, secundum quod est aotu ••••
SA. Laurent, "De Natura Actionis !lmnanent1s Secundum S. T'noDr vus !I'boma.s (Piacenza) vol. 41 (1938) p. 235: Unde quando
dloitur actiOnem lm.nmnentem esse actum perfect1, hoe non debet in
telligi causa1iter tantum (s10 enim solummodo ostendum elus dii"ferentia a motu proprie dicto), sed debet inte111gI formallter,
scilicet: est actus non tnntum a1lculus prinoipii quod iam est
perfectum, sed est formaliter perfectl0 ipsius agentls ut lueere
est perfectl0 lucidi. And on p. 236: Uhde talls actio quae propria operatio vacatur, jure dicitur formallter aotus peri"ectl.

mam, tt
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such an action -- an immanent action -- whioh is properly called
"operation. 1t

This is formally the actus p!rfecti.

Now, since it is evident that acts ot sensing and understand
ing (in man) are successi va and in time ~ what oan be the meaning

ot St •. Thomas when he characterizes the actus Rerfecti as nontemporal?

To understand this, let us first consider Aristotle's

distinction between aotuality and movement as it appears in the
Metaphpics: 9
Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end
but all are rela ti va to the end, e. g., the removing of
.fat or fat-removal, and the bodily parts themselves when
one is making them thin are in movement in this way (i.e.,
without being already that at which the movement aims) ,
this is not an action or at least not a complete one
(for it is not an end) J but that movement in which the
end is present is an action. E.g., at the same time we
are seeing and have seen, tal"e understanding and have
understood, are thinking and have thought (while it is
not true that at the sarae time We are learning and have
learnt" or are being cured and have been cured). At the
same time we are living well and PAve lived well, and are
happy and have been happy. If not, the process wouid have
had sometime to cease; as the process of making thin
ceases; but, as things are, it does not cease; we are
living and have lived. Of' these processes, then, we must
call the one set movements, and the other actualities.
In this text, Aristotle points out that actions are to be

distinguished as those which are ends in themselves and those
which are relative to ends.

Those which in themselves are ends,

those which represent in themselves an actuality are different
than those which are processes to something; this is a distincti
9Aristotle, Meta., 1048 h.tS-28.
phy;sics are from vr:-t1. Hoss.

Transla ti ons

or the

-ltIeta-

which suggests st. Thomas' distinction

l!.! ~

and.!!! ..t .....i_e....r ...
l.

:E.'very "movement n is incomplete; every "actualIty" is complete.
There is a distinction as part from part between that which is being moved from that which is moved; but on the other hand, it is

one and the same thing at the same time that sees and has seen. 10
(St. Thomas agrees with Aristotle in his commentary on this
text. l l )

In this sense, then, are sensing and understanding non-

_

--

the act ........
itself
....... admits no before and after. The importaut distinction to be made in this regard is that movement my

temporal:

accompany operation (or tlactuality") but is something distinet
fronl it.
In every created thing, the essence differs from its esse
and is cOlnpared to it as potency to act. But the act"""t"C)

10Ibld., l04Sb 29-34: For every movement is incomplete -- making thIn; learning, walking, building; these are movements, and
incomplete at that. For it is not true that at the same~ time a
thing is walking and has walked, o.r is building and has built, or
Is coming to be and has corne to be, or is being moved and has bee
moved, but what 1s being moved 1s di.fterent from what has been
moved, and what is movins from what has moved. But 1t is the same
thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinld
and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I eall an actuality, and the tormer a movement.
11St. Thomas" In IX Meta., lect. 8, #1862: Quia enim dixerat,
quod opus est finis, posm-aliquis credere t quod hoo asset verum
in omnibus. Sed ipse hoc removet, dicene, quod quarumdam activar
um potent1arum ultimus finis est solus usus potentiae, et non ali
quid operatum per actionem potent1a.e; sicut ultimus finis potentiae visiv8e est visio, at praeter sam non tit 8 potentia visiva
a.liquod opus operatum.
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which is compared the operative potency is operation.l~
Since a creature is not its own act of sensing or act of understanding, it is not its own sense or intellective power.

(Intel-

ligence is a. power whose act is inmlBnent, as we saiV above I and
whose act is of the per:rect~d] I as we shall see.)
stance the act
put

or

the potency -- that is the act

~

"In this in.-

which

II !!.

!n ..!S! --

being.

is followed by an action that is intrinsic to the
This is the key to the meaning of act~ Rorfecti. n13 St.

Thomas, in his commentary on the

.!?!

Anima,14 points out that the

operation referred to in sensation, 1s the act of the sense which
had already been made in aet through the sensible species.

Mo-

tion, then, applied to the act of sensing (or understanding) 1s
different than physical motion.
12st. ThOlnas, !_ .:fa •• I, 54. 3 e: In amn1 aut em oreato assentia dlrrert a suo esse et oamparatur ad Ipsum sicut potentia ad
aotum. Actus autem ad quem comparatur potentia operativa est
operatic.

13M• Miller, ltproblem of Action in the Comnentary of st.
Thomas on the Physics of Aristotle.," Modern Schoolman. vol. 23,
p. 151. ( Italic s mine)
•. "
•
14s t. Thomas, In III De Anima, "leet. 12: Et quia omne, quod
est in potentia, Inquantum-hujusmodl, est tmperfeotum ideo i11e
motus est actus imperfecti. Sod iate motus est actus perfecti:
est enim operatio sensus jam facti in aetu, per suam speciem.
Non enim sentire convenit sensul nisi in actu existenti; et ideo
iate motes (Sicl simpliciter est alter a motu physico. Et hujusmodi motu8 dlcrtur px'oprie operatio, ut sentlre et intelligere et
velle. Et secundum h1.IDC m.otum anima movst seipsam.

76

Sense or intellect therefore, is said to undergo change, or
to suffer only in this way tha.t there is a reception of species ;16
but "with respect to the act following the sense or intellect per
focted by species" there is no passio or motus but only the actus
perfectl. l6 The passive element in immanent activities, then,
pertains to the reception of a perfection or specification by formal object that is the principle of' the activity, but not the acl5Even this is not a proper use of aat,l says st. Thomas, In
III Sent., d. 15, 2, 1, qat. 11, c: Se q\ua patentiae apprenensl vai'""'S'ensi ti vae sunt ta..'"ltum in roclplendo speciem, quae quidem
non recipitur in sensu per modum rel, sed per modum intentianis;
ideo in operatlane harum vivlum est quldem aliquo modo pati, quantum ad hoc quod sunt vires materiales, et quantum ad hoc quod aliquld reclpitur (et propter hoc dlcitur in 2 de Anima text. 52,
quod sentlre est quodda..."ll pati). Sed quia senaus non movetur a
senalblll secundum condltlanem moventls, cum forma sens1bi1ia non
recipiatur ln sensu secundum esse materlale prout est in senslbi11, sed secundum esse splrituale, quod est proprium sensu! (unde
non habet contrarietatem ad sensum, sed est perf'ectio elu.a, nlsl
secundum quod ex.eedl t proport1onem sensus); ldeo non propI'le
dlc1tur pat!, nisl secundum quod e.xcellentia sensibl1ium"oorrumpit sensum, aut debl11tat.
16st • Thomas, In 1 Sent., 40, 1, 1 ad 1: Operatio semper est
perfecti, ut patet-rn sensu: sentire enim est quaedam opeI'atio
sent1entis, neo pI'ocedens in effectum a11quem circa sensiblle,
sed magis secundum quod species sensibilis in ipso est; tmde sentire quantum ad lpsum receptlonem speclel sensibllis naminat passionem, simillter at intel1igere quod etla.'k'J.1 pati quoddam est, ut
in 3 De Anlma (text. 2) dlcl tur: Sed quant'lml a.d actum oonsequentam 1psum sensum peI'fect'lml per speciem nominat operatlonem, quae
dicitur motus sensus, de quo dicit Ph11osophus (In 3 De Anima,
text. 11) quod est actus perfecti.
--
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tivity itself. l ?

Such a specification or reduction from potency

to act is characteristic only of beings that in some way are in
potency and are not pure act.

Having been put into act, there is

no longer a question of a tranSition trom potency to act; rather,
it is the developlnent of a perfectlon already possessed, an increase in actuality.1S

Father Laurent calls it a superabundantia

17G• P. Klubertanz, S.J., ~le PhilosoFhZ of Human Nature, pp.
90-91, has this to say about toe-passIvity o~en~ operation:
Inasmuch as same immanent operations involve the reception of an
act, perfection, or for.m, and all immanent operations are specified by their objects as by a formal principle, they can be calle
passive. But ••• tl~e passion correlative to a transient action is
the reception of a perfection from an agent, in place of a perfection formerly possessed. The passive immanent operation (as
far as the immediate efficient or eliciting cause is concerned) is
f'rom the i>atient itself'; the specification from the object does
not of itself Imply efficient causality; and when the object has
acted ef'ficiently upon the yatient the reception does not involve
the loss of a perfection formerly possessed.... In our experience, every passive immanent operation actually implies a prior
reception of a perfection. A tl pure" immanent operation would be
passive only in the sense of being specified by its object. This
pure irmnanencG.is partly exemplified in the intuitive self-knowledge of the angels" and entirely exempli.fied in the Divine knowledge.
last. Thonw.s exemplifies);Jy way ot knowledge" In II De Anima,
lect. 11, 1,367: Manifestat (!r1stoteleil utrum quoo edue!tur de
potentia in aetum scientiae patiatur. It primo man1festat hoc
circa id quod educitur de secunda potentia in actum purum. Secun
do autem manifestat hoc circa ld quod edueitur de potentia prima
in habitum.... Dicit ergo primo, quod habens scient1am, id est
habitualiter selens, fit actu speculans. Sed hoc aut non est ve
et proprie alte~ari et pati; quia, ut dictum est, non est propria
passio at alteratio, cum de potentia proeedit in acturn, sed cum
allqu1d de ccntrario mutatur in contrarium. Cum autem habitualiter sciens, flt speeulans actu, non mutatur de contrario in contrarium, sed proficit in eo quod jam habet. Et hoc est quod diei
quod "est additio in ipsum, at in actum. ff Addit'lJ.Z9 enm ei perfec
tio secundum quod proficit in actum.
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actus. 19
With respect to the principle of the activity, then, a livin
thing may be said to be !,loved to nct in that respect in which its
living-powers are potencies distinct trom its substance:

but this

motion is not the actus perfect,i, the immanent action proper to
lif"e.

Rather, once put into act, the living-power nets with an

increase ot actuality:
been perfected.

the (further) perfection of that which has

This activity, then, a Simple pertection, is the

actus Fartecti, applicable evon to God -- with the qualIfication,
of course, that His vital activity has no need to he put into
act. 20
With respect to the term ot the activity, st. Thana.s points
out that we expect "operation" to produce something. 21 This product or term of the activity either remains within the agent or is
produced outside ot it.

But the tact that a product remains with

in the agent is not the reason

"

1'01"

calling the operation immanent.

19r,aurent, "De Natura Actionis IIl"lllWllentis," P. 237.
2°Laurent lists four characteristics ot immanent action (PP.
238-239); 1). Est pertectio agentis secunda; 2) est pertactio
sinlplex (poteat invenir! tormallter in Deo at poteat Ident1tlcari
cum. e8S$ agentis) J 3) necessarl0 requiri t allquam immaterial! tatem quIa allquomodo det agent! perfectiones aliarum rertun; 4)
est dup11c1s ganeris, cognltio at appetitio.
21st • Thomas, guaest. Disp. de Veritata, 4, 2 c: ••• sicut
hoc nomen gperatio, quae procul dUbIo 1mPortat allquid procedens
ab operants: taman ista processus non est nisi sacundunl rationem
tantum.
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vVhether or not something is produced within or outside of the

agent, this, too, like the need £ar a principle of action, is Rer
accidens to the activity itselr. 22
Having distinguished motion and actIvity, let us now see why
self-motion 1s improperly said of i:ma:nanent activity.
are able to make this distinction:

First, we

"to live is to be moved by

oneselt'tf expresses the autonomy of vital activity" while "to live
is to move oneself" expresses the immanence of that activIty.23
In

both cases, however, as we have seen, self-lilovement requires

some sort of heterogeneity on the part of the agent so that it
will be both agent

L~d

patient in different respects.

Therefore.

an agent that in the strict sense is able to move itself would be
alive; but it would not be perfectly sL'"!1Ple and thus would include the imPerfection 01" motion in the strict sense.
points this out in c~~enting on Aristotle: 24

Hammond

22Laurent I p. 237: l'Immanenti!J tol'rldni omnino per accidens
se habere ad operationam'ipsam in ratione operationis. Quod enim
operatio producat aliquid siva extra sive intra subjectum agons,
~, ex hoc est perfactlc agentis prout est asens. sed pot1us
prout simul est patiens.
23M• Fatta, "La Transcendenza della Vita," Bolletinc Piloso.f!
vol. IV, p. 324: Vivere e 'mover1 a se ips'o': aofio quest'
angolo visuale ~ l'autonomia dell t attlvlta che risaltaj vivere e
'movere se ipsum': sotto quest'altro angola visuals e ltimmanenza ahe risa1ta.
00,

Co.

2~V. A. HalllInond, Aristotle's 'pSYCholo51.

(London, 1902), p. XiI!.

S. Sormenseheln

&
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Everything that f,10VeS itse1.f contains a duality o.f moving principle and thing moved.... Every living thing,
a plant no less than a man is a composite being (crJ'vcP)ov),
viz. a cOlm:>osite oJ: soul and body. The soul is the cause
o.f motion and change, and j.S therefore the 'efficient
cause t; it is further that which deterr.1ines the fornl or
ind! viduali ty ot the organism, and is there.fore the 'formal cause'; it is also the end .for which the body exists,
and is. for that reason, the '.final cause.'

And Aristotle himself points out that:
For, lIDless 1 am 11listaken, the definition of soul as
the self-moving, or as that which is capable o.f sel.fmotion, misrepresents its essential nature: nay, luore; .
it is quite impossible for soul to have the attribute
of motion at a11. 25
Any motions in the living thing pertain to the whole being that

happens also to be a material living thlllg. 26

.

Further, St •

Thomas points out that metaphorically even God could be said to

_

-

25Aristotle, De ..................
Anima, 40Sb31-40SQ2.
26Ibid ., 408~-l5: The soul is said to .feel pain and., joy,
con.fId€iii'Ci' and .fear, and agaIn to be angry, to pereel va and to
think; and all these states are held to be movements: which ndgh
lead one to In.fer that soul Itsel.f 1s moved. But this 1s no necessary In.farence •••• £ror even to suppose that-all these are
movement!] doubtless it would be better not to say that the soul
pIties or learns or thinks" but that the man does so with the
soul: and this, too, not in the sense that the motion occurs inthe soul, but in the sense that motion sometimes reaches to, some
tImes s tarts .from, the soul. (And St. Tb.a:nas agrees in S. Th., I
II, 22, 1 ad 2: Ad secundum dicend'lUll, quod pat! at mover! ~si
non conveniat animae per sa, convenit taman ai per accidens, ut
in I

-

De Anima dioitur.)

I,
III,

81

move Himself in so fa.r as He loves Himself .27

The point to be

stressed here. then, is that in its proper sense, life does not
mean self-movement; nor is self-movement equivalent to immanent

This is true even though life and a principle of im-

activity.

manent operation are necessary as the agent in selt-movement.
F'urther, as we saw in chapter three, the most immanent ot vital
activities is the act of' understanding.

We will, therefore, dis-

cuss a few aspects of tmderstanding as perfect lite.
LIFE PAR h"XCELLEliCE.

UnderstandJ.ng

is the perfect intl1l8.l1ent

aetion because i t neither depends ml prior movements nor is involved
on

~er

!! with external qualifications.

mOVeL1ent

standing.

1s

to be

taken as referring

to

Tnis non-dependence

the very act of tmder-

To become perfect through an intelligible species be-

longs to that intellect that is

samet~nes

in potency; but the

divine intellect 1s in no way in potency, needs no

intel~igible

species to actuate It, and is Its own perfection and own act 01"
27st • Thomas, In I Sent., 45, 1, 1 ad 3: Ad tertltml dicendum.
quod voluntas non move~ur niSi a. fine: f1nis Q.utem voluntatis

divinae est ipsa sua bonitas quae est idem quod voluntas secund'Ull1
:ree; et ideo non sequitur quod Deus sit movens motum, proprie 10quendo, quia omne movens est allud a moto. Sed forte propter hoe
l)lato posuit quod primum movens seipsum movet, Inquantum cognoscit se at amat se ••• at hoc non nisi metaphorice dicitur, sicut
etlw'll dleltur quod finis movet.
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undsl'l'Standing. 28
Aristotle points out that actually 11.fe acoording to reason
for rn.an is the presence of' something divine in him; and yet he
advisos us to £ollow such a lil'e
iIlg merely l'aortal things.

accordi..~g

to reason, transcend-

But this life, he continues, does not

really transcend man, rather it is the better part of him.
n~

should strive to live according to his better part.

more than anything else.!! man.,,29

In his co.mmentary,

And

"Reason

st.

Thomas

28st. TJ:1OOlaS, S. Th., r, 14, 2 ad 2: Non enim inte11igero as
motus, qui est act~ I;per.fectl, qui est ab alio in a1:tud; sed ac
tus per.fecti exlsten& 1n ipso agente. S1m1litel' etiwn quod intel
lectus perf!oiatur ab inte11:tgib1li, vel asslmiletur ei, hoc convenit Intelleetu:t qui quandoque est in potentia; quia per hoc quo
est in potentia, dl.f.fert ab 1ntel1igibl11, et assim11atur 6i per
speeiem intel1igibl1em, quae est similitudo rei intel1eotae, et
perflcitur per ipsam, sicut potentia per actmu. Sed 1ntel1ectus
divinus, qui nuJ.lo mooo est in potentia, non perticitur per intell1g1bl1e» neque asslm1latur ai, sad est sua peri'actio at suum
Intell1gere.
29Ar lstotle, Eth. Nlch., 1177b 30-117S8 S: Ir reason is divine
then, in comparisan-wl~E nwn, the life acoording to it is divine
in comparison with human li.fe. But wa must not follow those who
advise us, being men. to think of human things, and» being mortal
of' mortal things, but must, so far as We can, make ourselves 1mmonal, and strain every nel"VG to live in accordance with the
best thing in us; for even if it ba srnall in bulk, much more does
1. t in power and worth surpass everything. This wou.ld seem, too lto be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and better
part or him. It would be stmnge, then, if he were to ohoose not
the lite of his self' but that of something else. And what we
said before (l169 b33, 11761>26) will apply now; that which is
proper to aaoh thing 1s by nature best and nlost pleasant .for each
thing; ter man, theref'ore, the lIre according to reason 1s best
and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else is :man.
This lire there.fore is also the happiest. (This is Ross' translation. )

I

'I
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For that which 1s best 1n each one accwding to nature is
most proper tor him. But it tollows from being best and
proper that 1 t be IllOSt desirable9 because each one delights in the good that belongs to him. Therefore, 1t is
evident that i r E is most properly intellect as the
raost important
owe~ he has I then the life which is according to Inte lect is most desirable tor man, and most
proper to him. Nor 1s this contrary to what was said
above about this lite being not on the level of man, but
above him. For it is not on the level ot man in so tar
as he is a composite nature; but it is most proper to
:b..1m on the level ot that which is most important in him.
This type ot l1£e, it is true, is found most perfectly
in higher substances; in man it is found imperfectly and
as if participated. Yet, this little is greater than
all else in man.
Reasoning processes and sensible beginnincs ot knowledge are proper to understanding as man slmres in it; but, as we have seen,
these belong to man because of the potential aspects of his na-

ture.

It it were possible to grasp in a single intuition all the

conclusions contained in Imown principles, there would be no dis-

30St. Thomas, In X Eth. ad Nic., leet. XI: Illud enim quod
est optimum secundum natura.m-rri unoquoque est m.axlme proprlum sibi: quod autem est optimum at prapri'Um, conaequens est quod sit
delectabl11ss1mum, quia unusquisque delectatur in bono sib! convenient!. Sic ergo patet, quod a1 homo maxima est tntelleetus
tamquam prineipa11ssirnum in ipso, quod vita quae est secundum intellectum est delectabillssima hamini, at maxima sibi propria.
Nee hoc est contra id quod supra dictum est, quod non est secundum hominem, sed supra hominem: non est enim secundum hominem
quantum ad natura.m cOl11Posltam., est autem propriissime secundum
hominem quantum ad Id quod est princlpallss1mum in homine: quod
quidem peri'ectissime 1nvenltur in substantiis superioribus, in 1'10
mine Qutem imperfects at quasi participative. Et trunen istud
parvum est l'.l'lagis onmibus aliis quae in hOmine sunt.
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cursive process. 51

But as it is for man, there is a two-fold pro
cess in man's In10wledge: 32 ane is successive, wherein after we

tmders ta."1d one thing, we turn our a tten t i on to s ometh:1.!1.g e lae ;

the other is the reasoning prooess trom principle to conclusion.

"Man 1s indeed like the aneels in mind and intellect, but he ditte rs in his mode ot unde rs t8.J."1d ing. ,,33
Man, then, possesses two t'ypes of vital activities:

the one

in a sense exterior and in accord with his sensible, bodily nature; the other, in which there is real communication with God an
31St • Thomas S. Th., I, 58, 3 0; Sic igitur at interiores
Intellectus, sCii1cethominum, per quemdrun motum et dlacursum intellactualis operatlonls perfectlonem in cognitions veritatls
ad1piscuntur dum scilicet ex uno cognlto in aliud oognltum prooedunt. S1 autem statim in ipsa cognitione principii noti inspicerant quasi notas omnem conc1uslones consequentes, in eis discur
sus locum non habo1'&t.
'
32St. Thomas, 8. Th., I, 14, 7 c: In sc1ent1a entm noatra
duplex est discurB'Us :-unus secundum successionem tantum)" sicut
CUlil., postquam. 1ntellig1mus aliqu1d in actu, convertinrus nos ad
1ntel11gendum aliud; alius discuraus est secundunl causa11 tatelu;
sicut cum per principia pervenimus in oogn1tionem conc1usionum.
33St. ~lamas, s. Th., I-II, 89, 4 ad 1: Hamo convenit quidem cum ange11s in-mente sive in Intellectu; sed dirfert in modo
intel11gend1.... See also S. 1'h., I, 59, 1 ad 1: Sed 1ntelleetus at ratio d1ftol"tmt quan'rUllt'ad ::100um cog.'1oscendi: quia scilicet lntelleetus cognosc1t simplici intuitu, ratio vero discurrendo de uno in allud. Sed ta~';'len ratio par discursum pervenlt ad
cognoscendum 111ud quod intellectus sine discursu cognoscit, scilicet universale.

85

the angels. 34 Consider this remarkable text from the Metaphysics
of Aristotle: 35
And thinking in i taelf deals with that which 1s best in
itself, and that which is thinlc1ng in the fullest sense
with that which 1s best in the tullest sense. And thought
thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in
corning into contact with and thin..tring its objects, so
that thought and the object of thought are the same. For
that which is capable 01' receivinG the object of thought,
i.e., the essence, Is thought. But it is active when it
~ossesses this Object.
~wrefore the possession rather
han the receptivity is the divine element which thought
seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is
most pleasant and best. It, then, God is always in that
state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder;
and if' in a better, this compels it yet more. And God is
in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for tEe
actuality of thou~Vlt is life, and God is that actuality;
and God t S sel.f-dependent actuality is life most good and
eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being,
eternal, most good, so that 11fe and duration continuous
and eternal belong to God; tor this is God.

-

It is the possession rather than the receptivity that is the divine element in thought; it is the act of contemplation which is
"

the most pleasurable, best, and highest type 01" lite.

The actual

ity 01" thought is life -- a.nd so God is most truly alive.
an interesting conclUSion, indeed:

This i

there is no life tha.t !nvolves

a h1gher level ot activity than contemplation.

Usually we con-

54st • Thanas, S. Tll., II-II, 23, 1 ad 1: Ad pr1mum ergo dicendum, quod duplex est hordn1s vita.: una. quidem exterior secundum naturam sensibilem et corporalem, et secundum hanc vitam non
est nobis co~nunicatio vel conversatio cum Deo at angelia: alia
autelil est vita hominis spiritua.l1s secundum mentem; at secundum
bane vitam est nobis conversat10 at cum Deo at cum angelia.
35Aristotle, Meta., l072~7-29.

-
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trast the active and the

conte~~lative

life.

And yet, we now

see that the fullest measure of activity is found in
tion.

conte~pla

"Active life" means lire of notions, human actions, and

passions directed by the practical intellect; but our full happiness (in the next lii'e) is to be found in contemplation, while
imperfect happiness (in this life) is to be found principally in
contemplation and seoondarily in other activities. S6
LIFE AS OPERA'11 I,::m •

Lit'e is sa.id of lIvIng things in two

either to signify the very ..2!!.!! or the living thing, 01'> to
signify its operations. 37 vlith :respect to the second way lii'e is

ways:

predicated, Aristotle says:38
!low life is defined in the cnso of animals by the power
of perception, in that of man by the power of perception
or thought; and a power is defined by reference to the

corresponding activity, which is the essential thing;
therefore life seems to be essentially the act of perceiving or thinking.

3Sst • Thomas, S. Th., I-II, 3, 5 c: Tertio idem apparet [qU
beatitudo maNr"iS consiitlt in operatione speculativi fnte11ectus
quam practic
ex hoc quod in vita contemplativa homo eommunicat
cum superior bus, scilicet cum Deo et angelis, quibus per beatitudinem asaimilatl.U"j sed in his quae pertinent ad vitam activwn,
etiEU1l ali8, anlmalia cum honrl.ne aliqualiter communicant, licet imperfecta.
37St • '1"£101110.8, In I Sent., 8, 5, 3 ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum
quod vlvere in antmali CII'CItur duplicitur: uno modo vivere est
ipsum esse viventfs, sicut dicit Phi1osopl1US (2 De Anima, text.
37): Vivere viventibua est es~ei at hoc modo anima Immediate racit vivere quamlibet partem corporiS, inquantum est eius fonnaJ
alio :modo dicitur vivere pro operations animas.
38Aristotle, Eth. Nich., 11708 16-19.

--
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In this sense of the te:rm. lire means everything we have dlscusse

thus far.

For, our method has been an analysis of activity; and

our conclusion ha.s been an understanding of' what it means to say
that l1te is the principle of

ir~ent

activity.

.fine li1'e in terms of vital operations.

This is to de-

Thus, to sense is said

to be the life ot animals and to understand, the lite of men.

In

this meaning, lii'e is taken tor that operation towards which the
whole individual is espeeially orientated; in this sense, too,
li1'e 1s seen as the perfection of a potency, activity with respec
to a vital power. 39 On the other hand, the terms "to sense" and
"to understand" are not used merely to reter to the operations of
the one sensinG or understanding; rather, they more properly reliving thing, in such a way as to mean one
Imving the nature to sense or to understand. 40
fer to tho esse of

tl~

LIFE AS SUBSTAnTIAL.

"

In its fullest sense, 11fe 1s an es-

39St • Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 49, 1, 2, qat. 3 c: CU1us11bet
autem potentiae perI'ectl0 est suus actus: tmde secundo translatum est nomen vitae ad s1gnificandam operationem ad quam aliquis
seipsum movet, sicut sentire dieitur vita anima11s, et intelliger
vita hominis: et secundum hunc modum unusquisque illa..'lU operatlonem suam vitam reputat cui maxima intendit, quasi ad hoc sit totum esse su~~ ordinatum ••••
Ad pri mum ergo dieendum, quod Ph11osopnus-rbl accipit vlvere pro operations vitae.
Vel d1cendum est meliUS, quod sentire at 1ntel1lgere, at hujusmodi, quandoque sumuntur pro qulbusdam operatlonibus; quandoque
autem pro ipso esse sic operantium. Dicitur enim, quod vlvere
est sentire vel Intelligere; Id est habere naturam ad sentiendum
vel intell1gendum.
40St. Thomas, S. Th., I, 18, 2 ad 1:

88

sentia,l predioate/11

-

st. Thomas explains that the name lire is

taken .from certain observable .features about a thing, namely,
that it laoves itsel.f.

But the name is given not to signi.fy that

self-movement, but to signify the substance whose power it is to
:move itself to activity:
And in this respect to live is nothing else than to be
(esse) in such a. nature; and lff'e signifies this very
same thing, but in an abstracrwi'y. This is like the
name runn~ which signifies the very aot of' to run,
but aos£ra~ly. Therefore, life 1s not an acoidental,
but a substantial predicate.~o.metimes, however, li£e
is taken less properly f'or the ogeratians of 11.fe,-rFOm
wh10h the name itself is taken. 4;:;
"To live" is to be in sueh a nature; and Ifllt'e" signifies this
very thing, but in an abstract way.

What does this mean in the

light or our investigation?
Having discovered that an actual principle, a form, is the
sotwce of all, including vital, activities, we must now ask

41St • Thomas, S. Th., rII, 50, 5 c: Cum vita sit aliquid de
essentia. oorporis viventis, est anim praedicatum essentiale, non
accidentale; uncle consequens est quod corpus quod desinlt esse
viVum, non totaliter idem remaneat.
42St • Thomas, s. ~l., I, 18, 2 c: Sic ergo dicendum est et
de vita. Nam vitae nomen sumitur ex quodan1 exterius apparenti
circa rarel, quoC1 es~ movere seipsum: non taman est inlpositum hoc
nomen ad hoc sign1i'icandtll1l, sed ad signii'lcandum substnntiam cui
eonvenit secundum suam naturrun movere selps'Ui."n, vel agere sa quocumque modo ad operationem. Et secundum hoc vlvere nihil aliud
est quam esse in tal! natura; et vita signiflcat hoc ipsum, sed
in abstraoto; sicut hoc nomen, cUFiUS, signl.ficat ips~~ currare
in abstracto. Unde vivum non est praedicrunentum aceidentale, sed
substantia1e. ~uandoque taman vita sumitur minus propria pro
operntian1bus vitae, a qu1bus nomen vitae assumitur.
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whethe!' this form. is the ultimate SOU1"ce of vital activities or
whethe!' there is some p!'inciple actualizing even for.m.

As

we

esse, the
then, which is prope!' to

have seen in chapter one, there is such a p!'inciple:
act of existing.

'rhe act of eXisting,

a being, is the ultimate source of the vital (and other) activities of that being in so fa!' as it existentializes the activities
Esse itto such an extent ac-

as well as the nature from which the activities come.
self is the dynamism of the being; it is

tivity that only a verb properly expresses it.

A verb -- a word

signit'ying action -- must be used to point to this continuity of
"doing-sor:lething."

This activity, however, may take many dif-

ferent modes in different bein[;s; but each type of activity is
properly expressed by a verb, which expresses an aspect of the
act ot' existing itsel.f.

Thus it is that the act of living is the

act o.f existing which a living thing has, and "to live is·, to be
.for living things."
I

To live, then, is to be with the type of existence given by

I

Life signifies the very same existence, but differs as an abstract ter.m differs .from a concrete. Vlvere signi-

II

a certain form.

-

fies the activity of life as it is this lUe; vita abstracts .from
the one who lives.

This analogy is really two-fold.
to creatures, 1s said analogously:

-

-

Thus, to live is just as analogous as esse.
To 11 va, as aI/plied to God and
in God, to live is identified

with His esse; in creatures. to live is the esse Which is given

I'·I
I

!

III:
I I'

I
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by a certain form and thus bas the oharaoter of principle. 43

To

live as applied only to creatures, is also said analogously; but
it is said of' eaoh in the same way in one respeot, as a prinoiple

of' their being.

To oonolude, then:
1.

There can he no one assen'tial definition of life, even

tal<en abstractly.

Life is

ru~alogous

in the way it is found there.

and is applied to each being

There are, of' oourse, oertain logi-

oa1 olassifications of living things, but to "olassirrt means to
"leave out."

-

-

And there is nothing in a lIving thing to whioh to

-

live does not pertain; as also with esse.
2.

Vie

are a.ble to characterize, in terms of the metaphysi-

cal de.fin1tlon discussed in chapter one, the main aspect of vivere
which ha.s una1ogous application in different 1i ving things.
again,

v:.1v~re

is to be "defined u just as (analogously) as'

For,

~

1s

esse is that whereby an essence aotually exists, taklng essence in the wide sense to inolude accidents.
ude.flnod":

5.

Thus,

12 ....l.;;.l....ve....

is that perfection whereby all the other

perfeotions of' a potentially living thing are so aotualized that
43st • ~l~las; contra Gentes, I, o. 98: Vita enim viventis
est Ipsum vivere in quaaam aos\raotione sign1ficatum; siout cursus, secundum rem, non est a.llud quam ourrare. Vi vere autem
viventium est ipsum esse eorum, ut patet per Philosophum (De
AnimA, II, text. camm.. 75): O~1 en1In ex hoe animal dlcaturvIvens, quod animam habet, seoundunl quam habet esse utpote secundum propriam fo~~~, oportet quod vivere nihil sit allud quam
tale esse ex tali formaprovenlens. Deus autem est SUUl'll esse, ut
supra (c. 22) probatum est. Est erDo BUUl'll vivere et sua vita.
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such a being 1s able to elicit motions and operations that are in
some way of itself.
4:.

Of' course, such ter-l1l8 as

fI

IJotentlally 11 ving" are applied

to God a.£ter our :manner of dividing what is sir..1Ple so that Vie r..1UY
understand it.

Thus, the essence 01' God is thought of: as distinct

trom His existence, by a distinction of reason only.

This diffi-

culty only points up the Greater difficulty of including both God
and creatures under one "definition" or life.
5.

Life, then, in its proper sense, is a metaphysical prin-

ciple of being, nothing else than the esse, the act of existing a
living thing has.

In a less proper sense, lIfe is the vital ac-

tivity of a living thing, or the source of that activity.

In

either case, lire represents what 1s actual in a thing; as such,
its nature transcends matter and is applicable to God Himself.
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